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I. INTRODUCTION  
The central message conveyed in this chapter is that there is a whole class of economic 
organizations that contribute substantially to what Coase (1992) called “the institutional 
structure of production”. These arrangements fall neither under pure market relationships nor 
within ‘firm boundaries’. They have multiplied because they are viewed as efficient in dealing 
with knowledge-based activities, solving hold-up problems, and reducing contractual hazards. 
They have properties of their own that deserve theoretical attention and empirical 
investigation. 
  Indeed, although the significance of these arrangements, hereafter identified as 
“hybrids”, remains difficult to quantify, they play a major role in developed market 
economies. Joint ventures, strategic alliances, sports leagues, franchises, consortia provide 
instructive examples. As a first approximation, hybrids can be defined as arrangements in 
which two or more partners pool strategic decision rights as well as some property rights, 
while simultaneously keeping distinct ownership over key assets, so that they require specific 
devices to coordinate their joint activities and arbitrate the allocation of payoffs (Ménard, 
1997, 2004).2 Consequently, this chapter focuses on arrangements with joint mechanisms of 
                                                 
1
 This chapter owes much to the participants of the NBER workshop on “Organizational Economics” and to 
seminars and conferences held in Berkeley, Boston (MIT), Chania, Herdecke-Witten, Hertfordshire, Lausanne, 
Paris-Sorbonne, Pisa, Lucca, Rotterdam, and Delft. I have benefited from extensive exchanges with Robert 
Gibbons and John Roberts, and from fruitful questions raised by Claudine Desrieux, Anna Grandori, George 
Hendrikse, Geoffrey Hodgson, Chris Mantzavinos, Paolo Mariti, Mario Morroni, Joanne Oxley, Emmanuel 
Raynaud, Oliver Williamson, Josef Windsperger, and many others. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2
 This chapter follows Alchian (1987) in identifying property rights with the capacity to appropriate residual 
earnings.  
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governance.3 It pays particular attention to multilateral agreements (n > 2), so as to build 
‘ideal-types’ in which contracts are complemented by other means of coordination.  
Efforts for capturing the specificity of these arrangements within a coherent analytical 
framework remain underdeveloped. In economics, initial insights came from a Coasian 
perspective, with hybrids viewed as challenging the ‘boundaries of the firm’. Richardson 
(1972) already emphasized the importance of modes of organization which mix cooperation 
and competition.4 In his pioneering essay on franchising, Rubin (1978: 223) introduced the 
term “hybrid” as a catch word, extending the trade-off between market transactions and 
integration to situations in which decisions are jointly agreed upon among firms. This view 
concurred with the analysis developed simultaneously by Klein et al. (1978). Williamson also 
pointed out early the significance of these ‘non-standard’ agreements, although he initially 
considered them as unstable and transitory, before fully integrating hybrids into his model 
(Williamson, 1975, 1991; Ménard, 2009). Meanwhile, a significant literature has developed in 
sociology and managerial sciences, mostly about networks and alliances. 
Nevertheless, hybrids remain ‘theoretical orphans’, as noted by Borys & Jemison 
(1989), and this deficiency translates into “a rather messy situation marked by a cacophony of 
heterogeneous concepts, theories, and research results” (Oliver & Ebers, 1998: 549). A wealth 
of empirical material has accumulated, while theory has focused on relatively narrow issues. 
As rightly emphasized by Baker et al. (2002: 71), economists have rarely paid attention to 
these arrangements, and when they have, “the focus has typically been on asset ownership and 
other formal aspects of organizational structure”. 
 This chapter suggests that time might have come for economic theory to harvest the 
abundant insights on hybrids. One obstacle is the diversity of arrangements, from forms close 
                                                 
3
 Outsourcing illustrates the difficulty of delineating ‘hybrids’. Most outsourcing arrangements are of the arm’s 
length type, with no specific mechanisms of governance beside contracts. However, there are also outsourcing 
arrangements with coordinating devices going far beyond what is contractible (e.g., the ‘Toyota system’).  
4
 Almost simultaneously, Blois (1972) pointed out the empirical significance of ‘quasi-vertical integration’, 
although with no reference to Coase. 
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to market relationships to quasi-integrated organizations.5 However, I shall argue that 
structural characteristics underlie this diversity. In doing so, I focus on determinants of the 
existence and conditions of stability of hybrids. Particular attention is paid to the underlying 
modalities of governance. Section II illustrates distinctive features of hybrids with a stylized 
case, thereafter substantiated by an examination of the great diversity of these arrangements. 
Section III discusses the forces which lead to go hybrid, in the hope of outperforming markets 
as well as hierarchies. Section IV examines challenges hybrids face and strategic choices they 
can make to overcome opportunism. Section V explores the governance mechanisms on 
which hybrids rely in order to reach stability and remain sustainable. Section VI proposes a 
typology of hybrids based on the combination of the elements thus pinpointed.  Section VII 
concludes with remarks on unsolved problems and policy issues.   
 
II. WHAT HYBRIDS LOOK LIKE.  
The fluctuating terminology about hybrids signals conceptual difficulties. Three competing 
terms prevail in the literature: ‘hybrids’, mostly used in economics, particularly in the Coase-
Williamson tradition; ‘alliances’, a favorite in management journals; and ‘networks’ which 
dominates sociology.6 ‘Symbiotic arrangements’, ‘clans’ etc., can also be found, although 
more sporadically. ‘Hybrid’ benefits from covering the variety of inter-firm agreements while 
rooted in theory and models explicitly derived from Coase (1937).7 I do not intend to 
emphasize definitional issues here. The changing terminology reflects the richness of 
relationships among businesses resorting to means of coordination other than the price 
mechanism or direct integration. It also reflects the lack of a unified and satisfying theoretical 
explanation. To make these ideas clear, I start with an example that illustrates some of the key 
                                                 
5
 Cheung (1983) argued that there is a continuum in organizations and that contracts should be the sole focus of 
attention. In this chapter I try to show why this can be misleading.  
6
 The term here refers to networks of firms, not to network industries.  
7
 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘hybrid’ goes back to 1601 and designates the offspring 
of two different species.  
5 
 
issues involved. The picture is then enriched by visiting the variety of observable forms of 
hybrids. 
II.1: A stylized example8 
 In the late 1970s, confronted with declining bread consumption and strong competition 
from supermarkets using cheap flour and delivering mediocre products at low prices, a group 
of 35 French millers reacted by successfully developing high quality products. These were 
indicated by a brand name and supported by a complex organizational arrangement. This 
arrangement defines: (1) a formal structure, (2) an allocation of rights, and (3) governing 
modalities that markedly differ from the opposing situations of ‘markets’ and ‘hierarchies’.  
 First, the millers created a legal entity to develop high quality products, to market 
them, and to guarantee compliance to their standards by all partners. This entity, let us call it 
the “strategic center”, is governed by a Board of Administration, to which each miller 
belongs. Decisions by the Board are made according to a “one person, one vote” rule, 
notwithstanding the uneven distribution of capital: at one end of the spectrum, one miller 
holds 62 shares while at the other end another miller has 391 shares. The center legally owns 
the brand name, ‘delegating’ its use to the millers. The brand is marketed through a network 
of franchised bakers – over 3,000 bakers today – who are committed to selling exclusively 
products using inputs delivered by the millers or certified by the center. Each miller has an 
incentive to prospect bakers, whose affiliation is conditional to acceptance and monitoring by 
the center. Policies regarding the brand are implemented by an executive committee of twelve 
millers, elected by their peers for six years, and a marketing committee of three members. 
Lastly, an ‘ethics committee’ of three elected millers is in charge of solving conflicts. In sum, 
the millers own a franchisor to which they delegate the right to monitor and discipline them as 
well as to supervise the franchised bakers.  
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 This subsection draws from Ménard & Raynaud (2010). 
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Second, this arrangement proceeds through a complex allocation of rights. Each miller 
keeps control over key assets, i.e. mill(s) as well as the logistics necessary to collect inputs 
and deliver flour. Partners can use these assets for activities beyond the control of the joint 
entity: for example, producing and delivering flour to industrial bakeries not affiliated to the 
brand. However, the legally distinct strategic center holds property rights over the brand name 
and owns several facilities to carry out research, manage quality control, and train bakers. The 
strategic center also develops new products and thus creates new assets which it formally 
owns.  
Decision rights are allocated accordingly. The millers remain fully responsible for 
their own resources and their strategies. The strategic center makes decisions regarding the 
evolution of the brand name (new processes, new products, quality standards, marketing 
strategies) and of the governance structure (status of shareholders, contracts with bakers, 
allocation of social capital, and acceptance of new entrants or exclusion of partners). When it 
comes to payoffs, each miller remains the sole residual claimant for profits generated by 
his/her own assets, including benefits from the spillover effects of the brand name. However, 
royalties paid by the bakers are shared with the strategic center, which also bills ‘services’ to 
the millers (e.g., quality control). In principle, profits made by the strategic center are 
redistributed according to the number of shares, although they have been systematically 
reinvested in the development of the brand.   
Third, the governance by the strategic center is framed by contracts and by an ‘ethics 
committee’ that operates as a ‘private court’.  
There are two sets of contracts: contracts linking bakers to the network, which are 
typical franchise contracts;9 and contracts between the millers and the strategic center, which 
determine the hard core of the arrangement. Indeed the millers, who are the shareholders, sign 
                                                 
9
 See Lafontaine & Slade (2007). 
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a contract with the strategic center that gives them the right to operate under the brand they 
formally own. The goal is to favor spillover effects by developing high quality products, new 
techniques, and advertising, while protecting parties against negative externalities, e.g., 
millers cheating on the quality of inputs delivered or adopting free-riding strategies to attract 
or capture franchisees (the bakers).10 These goals are embedded in contractual clauses which 
codify: (i) the production process (control over equipment, determining the required quality of 
flour after each crop etc.); (ii) marketing conditions; (iii) conditions under which the center 
can ban a shareholder from the arrangement; (iv) the right for the center to authorize other 
millers to supply bakers previously affiliated to a ‘deviant’ partner.  
These contractual arrangements give significant power to the center. They are further 
complemented by internal rules and the role of an “ethics committee”.  
Internal rules facilitate upstream and downstream control. Upstream, major decisions 
such as changes in statutes, in the contracts between millers and the center, or exclusion, 
require a two thirds majority of the votes on the Board. Rules preventing any miller from 
holding more than 15% of the rights and prohibiting the sale of shares to outsiders without 
Board approval reinforce this control. Downstream, strict internal rules regulate relationships 
between millers and franchisees (the bakers): entry is filtered by the center, which also keeps 
an eye on newly affiliated bakers during the probation period of six months. Once affiliated, 
technical and commercial ‘assistance’ provided by the center facilitates control over the 
relationships between a miller and the bakers in its pool.  
Last, the so-called “ethics committee” operates as a private court regulating intra-
brand competition. Indeed, the reputation premium of the brand name, remarkably stable  at 
about 10%, as well as competition among millers to attract new bakers or capture affiliated 
ones fuel incentives to free-ride. The elected “ethics committee” is there to thwart these 
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 The affiliation of bakers determines volume sold, and hence profits. Typical free-riding behavior by a miller is 
to capture a baker who has been prospected and possibly initiated by another miller in the group, by offering 
advantageous conditions since the free-rider has not invested in the prospection and training process.   
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strategies, thanks its significant discretionary power, particularly its ability to impose 
penalties or recommend the exclusion of millers repeatedly transgressing the organization’s 
rules. On all these issues, the Board operates as a Court of Appeal. With formal contracts 
binding partners, it would be technically possible to turn to the legal system. However, this is 
viewed as disruptive and risky, incompleteness of contracts making the issue highly uncertain. 
After thirty years of existence, the partners have never been to the courts. 
To sum up, this case illustrates a mode of organization in which co-owners who 
compete in their joint activities as well as in activities independent of their arrangement 
delegate the right to monitor and discipline each other to a specific entity. They do so because 
the arrangement creates new assets generating extra profits, while simultaneously producing 
positive externalities to their other activities.11 The complex allocation of rights that support 
the formal architecture involved, as well as the mechanisms of governance needed for the 
success and durability of the arrangement are not specific to the millers’ case.  
II.2: A short visit to the “zoo” 
This stylized example captures only part of the richness of forms mixing cooperation 
and competition in inter-firm relationships. From joint ventures to franchisee-owned 
franchisors, sports leagues, condominiums, consortia, or even cooperatives, “firms have 
invented far more ways to work together than organizational economics has so far expressed 
(not to mention evaluated)” (Baker et al., 2008). In what follows, I focus on situations in 
which firms hand over decision rights and even property rights across boundaries, so that 
some rights are no longer controlled by a single party. I illustrate the variety of solutions 
implemented by several different institutional structures dealing with shared control. This 
review does not intend to be exhaustive, but rather points out properties analyzed thereafter. 
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 For example, the reputation gained through the brand has a positive impact on a miller’s relationship with 
parties not dealing with the brand (e.g., industrial bakeries or restaurants). 
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In its usual form, subcontracting goes side by side with standard market relationships, 
with parties sharing some decision rights, while keeping assets and property rights distinct. 
For example, Toyota shares substantial decisions regarding the design of its cars with its 
privileged subcontractors. This arrangement often relies on the stability of the relationship. In 
a pioneering paper based on extensive interviews with 38 homebuilders in Eastern 
Massachusetts, Eccles (1981) identified agreements between general contractors and 
subcontractors “over fairly long periods of time and only infrequently established through 
competitive bidding.” Although most projects were short term, coordination requirements and 
the need for constant adaptation provided incentives to operate with the same partners. On 
average, relations persisted for over 5 years (one had even lasted for 37 years), largely 
exceeding the duration of formal contracts. In over 80 % of the cases, subcontractors were 
selected through bilateral negotiations, while less than 20 % went through competitive 
bidding. This does not eliminate the role of competition as the possibility of bidding 
maintains market pressure. Other studies, particularly in the automobile industry, have shown 
the diversity of subcontracting, from arm’s length relationships to forms closer to supply 
chain systems, through to quasi-integration (Helper & Levine; 1992; Dyer, 1997; Holmstrom 
& Roberts, 1998). However, they all share at least two characteristics: key assets and decision 
rights remain distinct, as in the case of the millers, while one firm operates as the strategic 
center, which is distinct from that of the millers.  
Supplier parks, “a cluster of suppliers located adjacent to, or close to, a final assembly 
point” (Sako, 2005), share properties with subcontractors although site interdependence 
usually imposes tighter coordination. The Volskwagen assembly line of trucks and buses in 
Resende (Brazil) is typical. Several firms operate under the same roof. They keep key 
property rights and decision rights distinct (and several also supply competitors). However, 
specific assets and substantial decision rights are shared on the site, e.g., decisions regarding 
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the physical distribution of equipment or the adjustments between partners along the assembly 
line, imposed by the modular design of the subsystems. Supplier parks can also be partially 
‘virtual’, e.g., Toshiba and its 200 direct partners and 600 so-called ‘grandchild companies’, 
or almost entirely so as with Dell.12 In all cases, the allocation of rights and payoffs, as well as 
the choice of coordination devices remain sensitive. 
Whether physically located or virtual, supplier parks mostly operate under the control 
of one firm. However there are cases in which shared activities are monitored through 
different forms of joint agreements, with partners in a more or less symmetrical position. 
 Strategic alliances have attracted a lot of attention in managerial sciences. They can be 
characterized as “relatively enduring inter-firm cooperative arrangements, involving flows 
and linkages that utilize resources and/or governance structures from autonomous 
organizations, for the joint accomplishment of individual goals linked to the corporate mission 
of each sponsoring firm” (Parkhe, 1993: 795). Partners maintain core assets distinct and keep 
control over related property rights, thus departing from mergers and acquisitions. However 
they jointly plan and monitor substantial activities, as in the airline industry, using contracts to 
coordinate and build relational trust, which particularly matters when duration imposes 
continuing adjustments, making spot or short term agreements of the market type 
inappropriate (Gulati, 1995b; Jorde & Teece, 1989). Using a database of 12,500 contracts 
between biotech and pharmaceutical firms from 1973 to 2001, Baker et al. (2008) showed that 
the twelve top biotech firms and the twelve top pharmaceutical firms were directly involved 
in over 32 % of the alliances in the sector. Hence, a few firms make lots of alliances, defining 
a dense network of ties mostly related to R & D projects (55 % of the contracts). However, 
other studies show that R & D alliances can also be a one-shot game (Ryall & Sampson, 
2006). Holmstrom (1989) suggested that R & D projects may be prone to alliances because 
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 Some integrated firms attempt to replicate the traits of these external networks, e.g., ABB and its 1,200 
autonomous entities and 4,500 profit centers (Achrol, 1997). 
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they are: (a) risky; (b) unpredictable; (c) long-term and multistage; (d) labor intensive; and (e) 
idiosyncratic. The resulting problems of observability, with related risks of opportunism, 
favor recourse to constraining contractual clauses and carefully delineated rights. However, 
R & D projects are not the only engine of alliances. Strategic alliances exist in many other 
activities, from wholesaling in the American hardware industry (Dwyer & Oh, 1988) to the 
airline industry (Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998), to alliances between equipment and 
component suppliers (Artz & Brush, 2000). In all these arrangements, the relative symmetry 
among partners means that contracts have a key role as coordinating tool. 
Supply chain systems also rely on contracts, but differ from strategic alliances with 
respect to the density and extension of shared rights. Based on complementary activities 
and/or competences among autonomous partners, they require tight coordination across 
stages, usually from production to distribution. In a pioneering paper, Brown (1984) 
pinpointed the tight organization of transactions among independent parties in the dairy milk 
industry, through ‘administered channels’ monitoring quantities, controlling assortments, and 
guaranteeing quality. Ménard (1996) exhibited similar arrangements in the poultry industry, 
with a complex set of contracts linking breeders, slaughterhouses, integrators and distributors. 
The design varies, according to whether the arrangement is monitored by a leading firm or a 
specific governing entity. Supply chain systems benefit from powerful market incentives 
while providing tight control over key transactions, without the burden of integration. The 
analysis of these forms is a booming industry in the agro-food sector, logistics, etc.13  
Supply chains almost always involve production, while franchises concern primarily 
distribution. However, the boundaries between these forms are blurred, with many franchisors 
having developed tight vertical coordination to control inputs as well as output, as illustrated 
by McDonald’s. What differentiates franchising from most supply chains is the large number 
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 See journals such as Supply Chain Management, Journal of Chain and Network Sciences, etc. 
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of partners giving up part of their decision rights while pooling property rights to benefit from 
brand names and joint actions. Franchise systems also share characteristics of subcontracting 
because of the central role of the franchisor, whether it is a unique entity or a group as in the 
millers’ relation to bakers. The now-abundant literature on franchising almost entirely focuses 
on agency problems and financial constraints as explanations to their existence, with little 
concern for the various forms they take and the problems of governance they raise, beyond 
incentive issues (but see Lafontaine & Slade, 2007; 2011). 
Joint Ventures exhibit important characteristics of hybrids in a relatively pure form. 
JVs “are simultaneously contractual agreements between two or more organizations and a 
separate legal (and usually organizational) entity with its own purpose” (Borys & Jemison, 
1989: 245; also Hennart, 1988: 361-362). ‘Parent’ companies transfer some assets and 
property rights as well as some decision rights to a ‘child’ company monitored by a specific 
governing body, while ‘parents’ remain autonomous and often compete in other activities. 
This mix of global sovereignty and ‘local’ cooperation involves forms of hierarchy that 
complement contracts. The motivation comes from expected gains, either from knowledge-
based activities requiring competences that exceed separate capabilities, as in R & D projects, 
or from economies of scale, as when competing automakers jointly produce transmissions. 
However, JVs face issues of: a) governance, e.g., about rights they can claim over parents’ 
resources; b) of loss of control, e.g., the irreversibility of transfer of knowledge; and c) of rent 
allocation, e.g., measuring the value added of scientists involved in joint activities. Such 
problems may explain the short lifespan of many JVs (Hennart, 1988).  
There are many other ways to organize interfaces among partners. Partnership is 
another non-standard mode of organization, taking various forms, from law firms to the 
collective organization of salmon fishermen of the Pacific Northwest (Farrell & Scotchmer, 
1988). These arrangements often develop to deal with common pool resources. Cooperatives 
13 
 
define another important category, almost a class of its own. The variety of their forms makes 
their characterization difficult, since they are spread over a wide spectrum, from quasi-
integrated firms to market-like arrangements. However, numerous cooperatives share 
characteristics of hybrids with respect to the joint allocation of rights and their mode of 
governance, dominated by the “one person, one vote” principle (see Hansmann, 1988; 
Ménard, 2007b). 
In sociology and managerial sciences, hybrids are often described as networks.14 In a 
pioneering paper, Thorelli (1986: 35) characterized networks as long term relationships 
between two or more organizations. Powell (1990) suggested a distinction between: (a) 
networks structuring craft industries, e.g., construction or publishing; (b) networks shaping 
industrial districts, e.g., the Modena area or the Silicon Valley; (c) networks framing vertical 
disaggregation, e.g., subcontracting in the automobile industry; and (d) networks organizing 
horizontal coordination, e.g., strategic alliances and partnerships. The term then becomes a 
label more than a concept. A more specific approach, closer to Thorelli and to our concept of 
hybrids, identifies networks with durable collective action that requires specific governance. 
Early developments in the telephone industry illustrate the point (Barnett, 1990; Barnett & 
Carroll, 1993). The introduction of wire coils and new power technology at the beginning of 
the 20th century allowed the development of long distance calls to take place.  This in turn 
required coordination among hundreds of companies (public and private), cooperatives, and 
‘farmer lines’ operated by groups of farmers.15 Coordination imposed technological 
standardization, while parties maintained differentiated services and distinct rights. Similarly, 
the development of ATMs substantially increased the volume of transactions and the variety 
of services but also required costly coordination and control among banks, with ambiguous 
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 The term cluster is also used, although less often. 
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 In the period 1910-1930, 707 companies were operating in Pennsylvania. Interestingly, public authorities 
facilitated coordination. Between 1904 and 1919, 34 states adopted laws mandating interconnection among 
proximate systems. At the federal level, the ‘Kingsbury agreement’ obliged large American firms to accept 
connection all over the country. 
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organizational effects between incentives to integrate and incentives to outsource (Clemons & 
Row, 1992). The notion of a network is also often used, particularly in sociology, to label   
mini-societies “of interdependent, reciprocal exchange relationships” (Achrol, 1997: 68), 
shaped by “the density, multiplexity, and reciprocity of ties and a shared value system 
defining membership roles and social responsibilities” (ibid., 59). Aoki (2001, chap. 14) 
described the venture capitalists of the Silicon Valley accordingly.  
All these arrangements, as well as others (condominiums, consortia, etc.), differ from 
integrated solutions (the ‘firm’), which rely on a center that keeps control over decision rights 
and owns assets in the last resort, with well identified residual claimants. They also differ 
from markets, at least as defined in the neo-classical tradition, since markets preclude central 
coordination so that assets and related payoffs remain with separate owners, parties 
interacting exclusively through prices or through contracts that respect their autonomy of 
decision. However, hybrids can lean towards one or the other of these polar cases, depending 
on the intensity of the coordination required and the density of rights shared (see Section VI).   
To contrast hybrids with hierarchies or markets, let us reduce their properties to their 
simplest content.  Let us consider two firms, 1 and 2, and four assets {A,a; B,b}, with A and 
B related to the core activity of 1 and 2, respectively, and remaining within their boundaries, 
while a and b are assets which are valuable only if used jointly. Each firm holds full decision 
rights, DA and DB, while rights da and db require coordination as they are linked to the joint 
use of a and b. The resulting payoffs are therefore ПA, ПB, πa, and πb, with the latter two 
generated if, and only if, the corresponding assets are used jointly (profits are zero otherwise). 
Last, let us identify the governing entity, if it exists and whatever the form it takes, as the 
Strategic Center (SC). Three resulting “ideal types” (markets, hierarchies, hybrids) are 
summarized in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Forms of Organization Contrasted 
 
In markets, rights are allocated distinctly and partners process transactions through the price 
system, without interference of a joint strategic center. Cooperation that might be required to 
value some assets is monitored through contracts that do not encroach on the rights of the 
parties. In firms, divisions hold rights under delegation: in the last resort, they remain 
submitted to the control of the strategic center (the ‘headquarters’). In hybrids, key rights are 
in the hands of autonomous partners who retain titles as residual claimants, while subsets of 
assets, rights, and associated payoffs are shared and monitored jointly. The following three 
sections explore further why parties prefer this last variety of arrangements, what makes them 
sustainable, and what governance mechanisms could allow them to outperform other modes 
of organization. 
 
III. REASONS FOR GOING HYBRID 
Understanding why firms invest in projects that require loss of control over key rights raises 
important questions about why firms accept this loss of control and what pushes parties to go 
hybrid, rather than relying on pure market relationships or fully integrating. 
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 As already noted by Rubin (1978, Part 7), these questions are very much in line with 
the problem raised by Coase (1937; also Cheung, 1983). Choosing alternatives to markets as 
well as to integration is motivated by expectations of the improved allocation of resources: if 
hybrids exist and remain stable over time, it is likely because under certain conditions they do 
better at handling transactions. However, the paucity of economic explanations of why 
hybrids develop is striking.16 In what follows, I briefly review the theories embedded in the 
models exposed in other chapters of this book, and which assess the existence of hybrids.  
Then, I turn to a highly relevant empirical literature that relates only partially to these models, 
in order to understand better forces favoring hybrids. 
III.1: Theoretical Explanations 
 Any satisfactory explanation to hybrids must shed light on what motivates parties to 
pool strategic assets and share rights without integrating. It must also demonstrate how these 
distinctive arrangements can provide adequate safeguards against risks of free-riding while 
keeping incentives superior to alternative solutions. Conceiving of a firm as a production 
function and of markets as a price formation device does not account for the existence of 
hybrids. Economies of specialization (as in the construction industry), of scale (as with shared 
trade-marks), or of scope (as in joint R & D projects) likely play a role in the decision to pool 
resources, but do not explain why the optimal solution would not be merger or acquisition.  
Economic theory has paid attention to hybrids only recently, with transaction cost 
economics playing a pioneering role. Agency theory and relational contract theory have also 
taken into account some hybrid forms, while less developed approaches such as the resource-
based views have provided useful insights. With leading theories exposed in other chapters of 
this book, I report here only elements relevant to the analysis of hybrids. 
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 Transaction cost economics (TCE) deserves priority. The idea that there are 
alternative ways to organize transactions goes back to Coase (1937), followed by Williamson 
(1975). Both focused on the trade-off between markets and firms. However, in Markets and 
Hierarchies Williamson noted the existence of “intermediate forms of contracting” 
(1975:109), but expressed doubts about their stability and considered them as transitory. It is 
only in The Economic Institutions of Capitalism that he endorsed a more positive approach to 
arrangements later coined ‘hybrids’, going as far as considering them potentially ‘dominant’ 
(1985: 83). In 1991, he explicitly modeled them as a governance structure that could be an 
efficient alternative to ‘markets’ and ‘hierarchies’, from which they differ with respect to: 
(a) contract law, (b) adaptability, and (c) incentives and control. Hybrids would fit 
transactions requiring assets of intermediate specificity and facing moderate uncertainty, 
providing a ‘middle-of-the-road’ solution. The resulting concept remained a bit fuzzy, with its 
reference to ‘semi-strong’ governance captured essentially through ‘contract law’. This may 
explain why some ‘Williamsonians’ questioned the viability of a theory of hybrids (Masten, 
1996: 12), while critics challenged the idea that the attributes leading hierarchies to depart 
from markets (asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency) provide adequate tools to understand 
the existence and properties of hybrids (Powell, 1996; Hodgson, 2002).17  
Nevertheless, TCE has inspired a huge empirical literature (see the next sub-section), 
partly oriented towards enriching the heuristic model in order to substantiate the reasons why 
parties go hybrid. An illustration is provided by Artz & Brush (2000), who intended to face 
the often rehearsed critique, going back to Granovetter (1985), that TCE does not capture the 
social dimension supporting inter-firm agreements. To catch the role of interactions in the 
governance of hybrids, they introduced ‘relational norms’ as a complementary attribute (see 
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 From a different perspective, Holmstrom & Roberts (1998: 92) argue that: “Many of the hybrid organizations 
that are emerging are characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity, yet they do 
not lead to integration.”  
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also Gulati et al., 2000).18  From a different perspective, Ménard & Klein (2004) emphasized 
that the complexity of transactions at stake might explain the decision to go hybrid, while 
Ménard (1996) noted that interdependent transactions may command such arrangements when 
parties want to avoid the drawbacks of integration, particularly bureaucratic costs and weak 
incentives. Notwithstanding their limits, these contributions and numerous others testify to the 
efforts of TCE to capture better the nature and strength of hybrids as alternatives to markets or 
hierarchies. 
 The literature on relational contracts, which partially follows on from TCE, has 
shown a growing interest in hybrids (Klein et al. 1978; Klein & Murphy, 1988; Baker et al., 
2002 Malcomson, 2011). The initial inspiration comes from Macaulay (1963) and MacNeil 
(1974; 1978) who introduced the expression “relational” to emphasize the mix of contractible 
and non-contractible elements and the importance of the latter.19 According to Goldberg 
(1980; also Baker et al., 2002), parties establish tightly meshed relations to limit the impact 
of: (a) imperfect and costly information, (b) opportunistic behavior, and (c) difficulties for 
outsiders to enforce agreements plagued with non-verifiable elements. Hence “[t]he parties 
will be willing to absorb a lot of apparent static inefficiency in pursuit of their relational 
goals” (Goldberg, 1980: 339).  
 Formalizing this approach in a model initially developed to account for labor relations 
within firms, Baker, Gibbons & Murphy combined TCE and the ‘new property rights theory” 
to explain what forces push firms towards solutions such as joint ventures or strategic 
alliances (Baker et al., 2008). In this version, they differentiate governance structures 
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 Using a survey of 400 firms specializing in industrial and machining equipment, electronic and electrical 
machinery, computer equipment, and transportation machinery, Artz & Bush approximated ‘relational norms’ 
through three components (with associated proxies): collaboration, continuity in shared expectations, and 
communication strategy. 
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 When referring to ‘relational contracts’, economists emphasize the rational behavior of parties expecting 
future exchanges, while sociologists, who also refer to ‘relational governance’, intend to capture norms and 
social ties emerging from prior exchanges (Poppo & Zenger, 2002: 710). In the managerial literature, ‘relational’ 
often refers to informal contracts, as opposed to formal ones (Carson et al., 2006). In line with Goldberg (1980), 
Baker et al. (2002) and Malcomson (2011) rather incorporate non-contractible elements in the analysis. 
19 
 
according to how rights over assets and ‘spillover’ payoffs are allocated. If relational 
contracts might help dealing with non-contractibilities, they can also generate tensions and 
conflicts, the magnitude of the resulting transaction costs depending on whether the 
coordinated use of assets complement or compete with the core activities of parties involved. 
The problem then becomes that of choosing a “governance structure” that allows parties to 
maximize their payoffs while facilitating adjustments. Hybrids provide alternative 
solutions, possibly optimal ones, when there are significant non-contractibilities.20  
 A major characteristic and a limit of this explanation is that rights remain ultimately in 
the hands of separate entities while non-contractibilities make agreements unenforceable by 
courts, so that the outcome depends on (relational) reputation. As Malcomson (2011, 
conclusion) rightly emphasizes, “Relational contracts in these models are a substitute for 
enforcement by courts, not a substitute for careful planning.” 
 In contrast to TCE, this approach remains so far an exercise in theory. Some empirical 
analyses relates to “the spirit” of relational contracts in that they try to capture ex-post 
adaptations when some decisions are non-contractible. For example, referring explicitly to 
MacNeil (1978) and Baker et al. (2002), Poppo & Zenger (2002) use 152 reliable responses 
(out of 181) from randomly selected senior corporate managers of Information Services to 
show that ‘relational governance’ complement formal contracts. ‘Relational governance’ is 
here understood as social processes emerging from repeated interaction and which facilitate 
adaptation.21 However, such tests relate only to a limited extent to theory, because of 
conceptual differences (e.g., between ‘relational governance’ and ‘relational contract’).  
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 This departs from the prevailing approach in “the new property rights”, which focuses on whether A or B own 
assets; joint ownership may be feasible but is most of the time considered as suboptimal (see Holmstrom, 1999, 
who emphasized that in this approach it never pays to have joint ownership since either side can veto the use of 
the assets). Halonen (2002) extended the Grossman-Hart-Moore model (see Hart & Moore 1990) to cases in 
which it could be optimal to share some rights, but it is not clear if we end up with a different governance 
structure or simply a distinct sharing rule.  
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 ‘Relational governance’ is captured through four dimensions: open communication and sharing information; 
trust; dependence; cooperation, with associated indicators focusing on relations between vendors and buyers. 
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 There are alternative explanations to the existence of hybrids. Agency theory has 
inspired much research into franchising (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Lafontaine & Slade, 1997; 
2007), with incentives and financial motivation viewed as the main issues. For example, 
Maness (1996) and Holmstrom & Roberts (1998) suggest that franchising dominates fast food 
but not supermarkets because it provides better incentives to local managers having to 
monitor multiple inputs simultaneously, while costs in supermarkets mostly come from 
inventories and warehousing, which can be handled through specialized functions within an 
integrated structure. However, Lafontaine and Slade (1997; 2007) demonstrated that franchise 
contracts do not deliver tailored incentives, and that financial motivation has a weak 
explanatory power, contrary to what the theory predicts. More generally, Lafontaine & Slade 
(2007) show that TCE prevails over agency theory when it comes to predictability, and that 
the later hardly explains the existence and variety of franchise systems. 
 The resource-based view is another influential approach, particularly in organization 
studies and management sciences. Boiled down to its core, it explains networks and other 
hybrids as ways to deal with uncertainties and change by sharing essential inputs, 
particularly competencies (Wernerfelt, 1984; Nooteboom, 1999, chap.1). A positive 
contribution of this ‘view’ is to have attracted attention to the key role of learning and 
capabilities. However, it hardly explains why integration is not preferred to hybrids and why 
there are so many ways of facing uncertainty.  
 To sum up, we still need a convincing theory telling us why hybrids exist and prosper 
and how they differ from alternative modes of organization. However, and notwithstanding 
their limitation, the contributions summarized above help framing partial explanations 
dispersed in the empirical literature.    
III.2: Empirical Evidence 
21 
 
 A substantial part of this literature could be related to the unsettling question raised by 
Simon (1951) and reactivated by Cheung (1983): why do autonomous economic entities 
abandon substantial rights without certainties about payoffs?  More specifically, it must be 
asked why arrangements exist that deliberately avoid relying primarily on prices to coordinate 
activity without going as far as integration, in the hope of outperforming markets as well as 
hierarchies. Three determinants emerge from an abundant literature which is only partially 
grounded in the theories above: an improved capacity to face uncertainty, the creation of 
value through mutually accepted dependence, and the expected positive spillovers if adequate 
rules for sharing are implemented. 
 A: An instrument to deal with uncertainty. A possible motivation to go hybrid is that 
sharing rights and pooling resources improve capacities to face uncertainty. I take uncertainty 
here to be contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and which generate 
problems of adaptation (John & Weitz, 1988). As already pointed out by Eccles (1981) in his 
study on the construction industry, inter-firm nettings respond to the combination of the 
specificity and high variability of each project, making adaptability a key issue.  
 Uncertainty has always been viewed by TCE as a key attribute conditioning 
organizational choices ex-ante. TCE also shares with the relational contract approach the idea 
that ex-post non-contractibilities impose adaptation, determining the ‘fitness’ of these choices. 
However, there are few tests in economics on the role of uncertainty in the decision to go 
hybrid,22 while uncertainty is viewed as a driving force in the sociological and managerial 
literature (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). For example Carson et al. (2006: 1059) proposed a 
distinction between ‘volatility’, defined as “the rate and unpredictability of change in an 
environment over time,” due to exogenous shocks; and ‘ambiguity’, understood as “the 
degree of uncertainty inherent in perceptions of the state of the environment, irrespective of 
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 There are some tests on the role of uncertainty in decisions to integrate, e.g., Anderson (1985) and Saussier 
(2000), who estimated the role of uncertainty in the ‘make’ or ‘buy’ trade-off.   
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its change over time.”  Using data from 125 informants on client-sponsored R & D 
relationships, they showed that formal contracts would be inefficient when volatility is high, 
while relational contracts fail when ambiguity is high.   
 This suggests diversity in the types and sources of uncertainty, pushing parties to pool 
resources without integrating. It might partially explain the variety of hybrids. First demand 
can be unstable or unpredictable. Using a survey of 183 responses collected in three Canadian 
industrial sectors (non-electrical machinery, electrical and electronic machinery, 
transportation equipment), Joshi & Stump (1999) showed that market turbulence plays a more 
significant role than competitive intensity in the decision to go hybrid. Second, technological 
change can promote hybrids as a means to accelerate innovation or its adoption (Park, 1996; 
Ghosh & John, 1999; Powell, 2003; Ryall & Sampson, 2006). Superior technologies require a 
flexibility that the bureaucracy of integrated firms hardly provides, while hybrids would 
benefit from shared learning and resources (Anderson & Gatignon, 2005). Third, variations 
in the quality of inputs and/or outputs may require tighter coordination than markets provide, 
as supply chain systems illustrate (Ménard & Valceschini, 2005). Fourth, risks of 
opportunism might encourage constraining agreements that mitigate hazards while preserving 
autonomy on key decisions. The role of opportunism in organizational choices (Williamson, 
1975, chap. 2) underlies countless tests, starting with Anderson (1985),23 and provoked strong 
reactions, particularly among sociologists who defend trust as a more likely response to 
uncertainty. In both cases, there is room for hybrids. Last, unsecured environments, e.g., 
property rights poorly defined or not backed by adequate institutions, generate 
“appropriability hazards”, as in technology transfers, which hybrids could overcome without 
the disadvantages of full integration (Oxley, 1999).  
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 It is also a key argument used by Hansmann (2011) to explain the existence of franchisee-owned franchisors.  
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 In developing joint strategies, sharing knowledge and risks, implementing common 
standards, and adopting adequate governance, hybrids might provide solutions not available to 
alternative arrangements (Robinson & Stuart, 2007; Baker et al., 2008). This could explain 
preferences for socially embedded relationships rather than arms’ length relationships when 
uncertainty is high (Khanna, 1998; Gulati, 1998), when high adaptability is required (Uzzi, 
1997; Podolny & Page 1998), or when it is difficult to differentiate between poor performance 
and bad luck (Park, 1996: 803). However, the exact impact of uncertainty on the choice and 
performance of hybrids remains under-explored, likely because of difficulties in finding 
adequate proxies and collecting appropriate data. 
 B: Creating value through accepted interdependence. Partners to hybrids share some 
rights and assets although they often remain competitors and face uncertainty over possible 
payoffs, as illustrated by the millers’ case or sports leagues. Why do they accept this mutual 
dependence on strategic segments of their activities, even when uncertainty is low?   
 An unambiguous answer is that they expect added value from their joint investments 
as well as from the spillover effects of these investments on assets and capabilities which are 
not pooled: they commit in the hope of creating values unattainable otherwise (Borys & 
Jemison, 1989: 241). This strategic choice goes beyond cost minimization (Gulati, 1998). As 
noted by Madhok & Tallman (1998: 336): “The flows of quasi-rents that stem from the 
dynamics among these relationships tend to hold the system together so long as the participant 
actors recognize that rents could well disappear with the alliance relationship, thus providing 
an economic incentive to avoid opportunistic actions.”24  
 The creation of value added may lie in the following sources.  
 Size is one possible determinant. When investments exceed the capacities of parties 
working solo (e.g., marketing products, promoting standards, supporting R & D), firms might 
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 See also Klein et al. (1978) and Klein (1996). 
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expect rents from bundled resources.25 Joint assets might generate economies of scale and/or 
economies of scope (Park, 1996). However this explanation remains limited, notwithstanding 
the advantages rooted in technology.  First, if capital markets are efficient, it needs to be 
asked why firms cannot find adequate support from banks or other lenders rather than taking 
the risk of pooling strategic resources. Second, if size matters, why not integrate? In a survey 
of 225 independently-owned companies in the human biotechnology sector over 1990-1994, 
Powell et al. (1996) demonstrated that it is from building “a sea of informal relations” 
(p. 120) rather than size that firms expect gains.26 
 In this respect, complementarity might provide a powerful incentive to go hybrid. 
Mutual dependence becomes strategically valuable if it secures supply of existing resources, 
allows access to new resources, or facilitates diversification. In the same vein, separate firms 
may not have resources to develop independent ‘absorptive capacities’ (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990), thus motivating strategic alliances, joint R & D projects, etc. Complementarities 
between innovative firms and well-established ones when financial markets impose tight 
constraints may also push firms towards hybrid arrangements. Lerner & Tsai (1999) argue 
that the receptivity of financial markets to the biotech industry is cyclical, so that when 
markets are ‘cold’, biotech firms turn to pharmaceutical and chemical companies. However, 
complementarities involve risk: innovation may fail, demand may change, and partners may 
behave opportunistically. Numerous studies emphasize the role of relational norms and social 
ties as buffers against these risks (e.g., Heide & John, 1992; Artz & Brush, 2000).  
 Learning effects provide another incentive to go hybrid, partially overlapping with 
complementarity. When markets cannot adequately bundle tacit knowledge and capabilities 
while firms need skills they cannot develop autonomously, incentives to join forces develop 
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 Powell (2003) argues the opposite, namely that spin-offs are often preferred to multidivisional structures by 
large corporations in order to benefit from financial advantages (e.g., federal grants, issuing stocks, attracting 
new investors fascinated by the ‘new economy’) as well as from legal ones (e.g., limited liability). 
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 “We argue that when knowledge is broadly distributed and brings a competitive advantage, the locus of 
innovation is found in a network of interorganizational relationships.” (Powell et al., 1996: 119).     
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(Teece et al., 1997; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Ryall & Sampson, 2006). When hybrids 
become portfolios of skills, they transfer and recombine, leading to new know how  (Powell et 
al. 1996; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Podolny & Page, 1998; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Powell, 
2003). However, joint learning effects remain difficult to capture and model, so that assessing 
their role is challenging. 
 These factors point to the expected gains from pooled resources. Yet, sharing 
resources has drawbacks: it requires inter-firm planning, which restricts individual decision 
rights and might generate costly negotiations and/or renegotiations. This begs the question of 
why integration is not preferred. Coase (1937) suggested limited managerial capacities as an 
explanation. Williamson (1996, p. 150) goes a step further, arguing that ‘selective 
intervention’ that would allow integrated firms to replicate successful properties of alternative 
arrangements can hardly be achieved.  Brickley & Dark (1987) argue that franchising 
develops because acquisitions may be too costly or too difficult to swallow, or resources 
needed to integrate are too difficult to evaluate (also Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Brickley, 
1999). Baker et al. (2002) propose an alternative explanation. Upstream ownership decreases 
downstream parties’ temptations to renege but creates temptation for upstream parties to 
renege. If the first consideration dominates, integration is optimal; otherwise, sharing rights 
through non-integrative arrangements could offer the appropriate solution. 
C: Sharing rent while checking opportunism. Williamson (1991) argued that when markets do 
not provide adequate coordination, hybrids might be the first best solution since they maintain 
higher incentives than integrated firms. Incentives in hybrids are three-dimensional: (1) each 
firm remains residual claimant on payoffs provided by its own assets; (2) each partner can 
claim a share of the rent generated by jointly used assets; (3) all partners may cash rents from 
activities unrelated to the arrangement, thanks to spillover effects of their joint reputation. In 
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sum, parties accept mutual dependence because they expect increased ex-post surplus, which 
improves ex ante incentives to join and invest.27  
In this context, allocation of asset ownership becomes a key issue since “[it] provides 
levers that influence bargaining outcomes and hence incentives” (Holmstrom & Roberts, 
1998: 79). However, this presumes the possibility of an unambiguous distribution of rights, 
while in many hybrids payoffs of type (2) and (3) are not contractible, or only partially so. 
Going hybrid and relying on relational contracts might then be an efficient solution when 
costs of integration would be too high while contributions from interdependent assets are 
difficult to assess. This approach is consistent with Hansmann (2011) who emphasizes the 
trade-off between costs of ownership and costs of contracting in choosing a mode of 
organization. Although there are cases with returns strictly proportionate to equity shares, as 
in many joint ventures, most hybrids rely on incomplete agreements, because standard 
contracts perform poorly or because of measurement problems – as in joint R & D – so that 
“organizing a satisfactory split of the gains becomes non-trivial” (Ghosh & John, 1999: 
133).28 The inadequate allocation of rents could challenge the comparative advantages of 
hybrids, with partners: (a) scaling back investments, (b) adapting less, or (c) forgoing 
activities that raise hazardous measurement problems. This explains why hybrids are often 
considered suboptimal (Rey & Tirole, 2001). 
If we keep in mind this strategic significance of rent sharing rules in hybrids, we 
would expect an abundant literature on this issue. It is not so. Contributions remain scarce and 
focus essentially on two mechanisms, royalties and tournaments, which both presume well 
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than free-riding in the hope for some of them to get a rabbit. Cooperation then dominates alternative strategies. 
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anteriority is unclear or when input contributions are difficult to identify, which is often the case in hybrids.  
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defined rights. Royalty rules have been explored extensively for franchise systems. They 
typically have a linear form, e.g.: 
Fees = F + βy,  
where F is a lump sum, y the total sales, and β the royalty rate, in most cases in the 4-8 % 
range (Lafontaine, 1993; Lafontaine & Slade, 1997). This standardized rule challenges the 
idea that contracts vary incentives to match specific conditions across sectors, regions, etc. 
Ménard (1996) reached a similar conclusion in his analysis of producers’ groups in the 
certified agri-food sector, and Rubin (1978: 227) already asked why franchisees accept such 
rigid rules.29  
A variation of this rent sharing rule, and a more flexible one when factors determining 
contributions are difficult to assess, is to rank parties according to specific variables as in 
tournaments, with the possibility of integrating qualitative factors. Using data from contracts 
among breeders and integrators in the poultry industry, Knoeber (1989) showed that ranking 
breeders makes it possible: (a) to adapt cheaply to changing productivity without 
renegotiating; (b) to bind growers to integrators when the former provide their own assets; (c) 
to induce self-selection of high quality growers;30 and (d) to facilitate truthful revelation.31  
However, tournaments depend on the capacity to rank contributions and match them 
with contributors, which is hardly universal for hybrids. As argued by Ménard (2004; also 
Oudot & Ménard, 2010), when transactions become complex and contributions not verifiable, 
as in R & D projects, non-contractible rules such as “fairness” (Grandori & Soda, 1995: 196) 
or “perceived equity” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) and ex-post bargaining tend to prevail. 
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incentive to motivate the franchisor to be efficient –that is, just as the franchisor desires the franchisee to run the 
operation efficiently, so the franchisee desires to give the franchisor an incentive to be efficient in those aspects 
of the relationship which require an ongoing performance by the franchisor.” (Rubin, 1978, p. 227) 
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 Contracts can be cancelled if a breeder’s performance is consistently below average. 
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 Other references to tournament rules among partners in agri-food chains are Tsoulouhas & Vukina, 2001; and 
Wu & Roe, 2006. A reference in sports is Ehrenberg & Bognanno (1990) about golf, but this is a limited 
example since performance can be easily associated with individual golfers. 
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These insights remain limited. Many discussions on sharing rules in hybrids focus on 
specific devices based on the allocation of risks, e.g.: (a) fix prices in chain systems in which 
suppliers support all risks; (b) ‘target prices’ with shared risks; and (c) cost-plus formulas in 
which the buyer supports all risks. These solutions apply to situations with rights 
unambiguously identified. When it comes to non-contractibilities, the literature remains 
elusive. Since finding ways to share rents while preventing free-riding is so crucial to hybrids, 
this paucity of analyses is striking. It may be due to the neglect of hybrids by economic 
theory, but also to the difficulty of capturing how rents are allocated without well-defined, 
contractible rights.  
  
IV.  HOW TO FACE OPPORTUNISM: THE SUSTAINABILITY OF HYBRIDS 
The difficulties that hybrids face in finding appropriate rules for sharing out the profits of the 
positive externalities generated by their members’ interaction, while simultaneously 
confronting competitive pressures from partners as well as from outsiders, are a source of 
tensions and impose hard choices.32  Solutions condition the possibility for hybrids to 
outperform markets as well as hierarchies.  The survival and stability of hybrids depend on 
their capacity to find the right partners, to circumscribe risks of opportunistic strategies, and 
to implement procedures for arbitrating conflicts and reducing tensions among parties.  
IV.1: Challenges to stability 
Hybrids combine joint efforts and competing goals, which continuously create tensions 
among partners who intend to maintain a fruitful cooperation while ensuring the worth of 
their own assets.  Richardson (1972) already emphasized variations in tensions among 
partners to inter-firm agreements, depending on whether they share physical assets while 
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29 
 
competing, or whether they create joint resources to benefit from complementarities without 
competing.  
First, there is the strategic decision about what resources to pool. Partners might: (a) 
develop a subset of resources from which each one can draw, as in many R & D projects; (b) 
share resources sequentially, as with logistics in supply chain systems; (c) build and maintain 
joint assets, as in collective trademarks.   Pooling financial resources is a classical example: it 
is a leading explanation to the existence of franchising,33 in that this secures expanding 
markets that are hardly accessible otherwise (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Oxley, 1999) while 
simultaneously tightening links among partners (Aoki, 1988, chap. 4).34  Pooling physical 
assets might also support mixed strategies, as with laboratories jointly built and monitored by 
partners in the biotechnology industry (Powell, 1996). Similarly, sharing human assets may 
allow spillover effects in competencies and know-how to emerge. However, pooling resources 
challenges the competitive advantage that each partner could expect from developing its own 
specific assets. Hence, partners weigh up the need to commit versus the risk of capture. 
Second, the combination of separate and shared rights makes monitoring and 
disciplining parties particularly challenging, and is used as an argument to qualify hybrids as a 
second best solution (Rey & Tirole, 2001; Baker et al., 2008).  Mixing cooperation and 
competition, termed ‘coopetition’ by Nalebuff & Brandenburger (1998), might not be 
exclusive to hybrids: employees or divisions compete within firms, notwithstanding expected 
cooperation.35 What distinguishes hybrids is the need to stabilize cooperation among 
otherwise competing partners without relying on hierarchy and with limited control over 
strategic rights.  
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34
 Cross financial participation among top shareholders may end up with control in the hands of the network, 
which raises the issue of its adequate governance, as pointed out by Aoki in the case of ‘keiretsu’.   
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 Tirole (1986; also 1988, chap.1) defined firms as a “network of coalitions and contracts that interplay.”   
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On the one hand, accepted interdependence imposes constraints on the usage of pooled 
resources from which common returns as well as private benefits are expected (Gulati et al., 
2000; Baker et al., 2008).36 These benefits differ from those coming from the industry level 
(e.g., market structures or technological innovation) or from heterogeneity among firms (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). On the other hand, partners remain competitors. Hergert & Morris (1988) 
noticed that 71% of strategic alliances concern parties competing on the same market. Ménard 
(1996) found similar results among networks in the poultry industry, and so did Park (1996) 
in a study of 204 equity-based inter-firm linkages in the electronics industry, as did Robinson 
& Stuart (2007) in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. 
The challenge of ‘stability versus autonomy’ that coopetition entails might help 
understanding observable gaps between the duration of formal contracts and the duration of 
contractual relationships in hybrids. Hakansson (1989; and Hakansson & Johansson, 1993) 
documented the stability of networks among small and medium-sized enterprises in Sweden, 
notwithstanding the short duration of formal contracts, with two thirds of partnerships lasting 
for more than 4 years, with an average duration of 13 years. This confirms similar 
observations in the construction industry (Eccles, 1981), among French small and medium-
sized manufacturing firms (Paché & Paraponaris, 1993), in the agri-food sector (Ménard, 
1996), etc. However, tensions over usage of pooled resources or rent sharing also carry risks 
of instability, which can go as far as a breach of contracts. For example, the ‘mortality rate’ in 
horizontal alliances is higher than in vertical ones, due to competition (Bleeke & Ernst, 1993). 
Sampson (2005) also found a high rate of dissatisfaction and alliance termination in 464 R & 
D alliances in the telecoms industry, over the period 1991-1993, while Khanna (1998) noted 
the risk that “racing” strategies among partners increases instability, particularly when mutual 
learning is at stake. Ambiguities about residual rights and difficulties in implementing clear 
                                                 
36
 Powel (1996: 211) noted for high tech sectors that “membership in a common technological/intellectual 
community creates strong and visible mechanisms for peer-based governance.”  
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sharing rules push hybrids to search adequate mechanisms of governance (Park, 1996; 
Ménard, 2004). Finding stability without challenging the autonomy of partners remains a key 
issue in hybrids. 
IV.2: Finding the right partners 
In this respect, selecting the right partners becomes crucial.  Two dimensions of 
selection have particularly attracted attention. First, antecedents signal the reliability of 
potential partners and provide insights into the compatibility of management systems and 
decision processes (Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995). In a series of papers on strategic 
alliances and networks Gulati (1995b), Gulati & Gargiulo (1999), and Gulati et al. (2000) 
showed that repeated interaction among parties is a key component in the selection process. 
Using data from 1980 to 1989 on 166 organizations evenly distributed in the US (54), Europe 
(46) and Japan (66), and operating in three industrial sectors (new materials, industrial 
automation, and automotive products), Gulati & Gargiulo (1999) showed the importance of 
“trusted informants” and/or “information from one’s own past dealing with this person” in 
choosing partners and reducing uncertainties in the formation of alliances. In line with 
Granovetter (1985; also Dyer & Singh, 1998: 666 & sq.), they emphasized: (a) past 
cooperation (“relational”), (b) indirect ties through third parties (“structural”); and (c) the role 
of potential partners in pre-existing (“positional”) alliances as factors determining selection.  
The analysis of the role of ‘centrality’ and ‘proximity’ in Robinson & Stuart (2007) concurs. 
However, Poppo & Zenger (2002) and Ryall & Sampson (2006) highlighted some puzzling 
effects of antecedents: prior alliances develop trust, signaling the high value of a relationship 
and encouraging informal governance, but repeated interactions also improve information and 
the capacity to write detailed contracts, making highly formal relationships easier to 
implement. 
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Second, the imposition of restrictions on potential partners operates as a screening 
device. Selection means barriers to entry. Hybrids have a more or less open architecture. 
Powell (1996) emphasized that cross-traffic of researchers between universities and firms and 
among firms in the biotech industry facilitated the development of co-specialized assets. 
However, Ménard (1996) pointed out the tight restrictions imposed on partners in the French 
‘label’ system, and Baker et al. (2008) found a similar pattern in biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical alliances, dominated by a hard core of 12 firms, while Grandori & Soda 
(1995: 196) argued that the broader the scope of cooperation, the stricter are the rules of 
access. According to Dyer & Singh (1998), variability in openness depends on: (a) the level of 
ambiguities about sources of rents; (b) the degree of replicability of resources generating 
rents; (c) the degree of imitability of resources to be pooled; (d) the availability of partners of 
the same type; (e) the accessibility to capabilities they offer; and (f) specificities of the 
institutional environment.  
All in all, hybrids’ permeability remains limited by provisions determining resources 
to be pooled, delineating decisions to be shared, and fixing rules of governance. The resulting 
contractual constraints, e.g., (a) non-linear pricing; (b) royalties; (c) minimum prices; (d) 
quotas; (e) exclusive territories; (f) exclusive distribution; (g) packages, and other 
commitments are integral components in selecting and monitoring partners. They also 
severely challenge competition policies (Rey & Tirole, 1986; Ménard, 1996; 2007a). 
IV.3: Straightening ties to reduce opportunism 
Beyond selection, the “willingness of trading partners to exert effort on behalf of the 
relationship” (Mohr & Spekman, 1994: 137) is central to sustaining a stable arrangement 
while checking opportunism. Shared goals and common expectations legitimize coordination, 
facilitate joint decisions, and prevent free-riding. In an extensive analysis of 166 alliances, 
Gulati (1995b) showed that firms prefer to deal with partners already interacting with others, 
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thus benefiting from informational advantages and mitigating control concerns. Many others 
confirm that “[t]he social dimensions of inter-organizational relationship play a crucial role in 
controlling and coordinating behavior in transactions” (Bradach, 1997: 294), including: 
Powell et al. (1996) or Robinson and Stuart (2007) on biotechnologies; Baker et al. (2008) on 
alliances between biotech and pharmaceutical firms; and Aoki (2001, chap. 14) on the role of 
venture capitalists in building networks in the Silicon Valley,  
This importance of informal relationships was already emphasized by Macaulay in 
1963. In the 1980s, several contributions focused on the role of social ties in ‘non-standard’ 
modes of organization. Ouchi (1980) introduced the notion of ‘clans’ as homogeneous 
networks minimizing goal incongruence while tolerating high ambiguity about outcomes, 
thanks to shared values. Ben-Porath (1980) pointed out the role of social ties in overcoming 
high uncertainty (e.g., about quality, or when obligations are spread over time).   Granovetter 
(1985; also Zucker, 1986 and Adler, 2001) extended the idea to inter-firm relations in an 
influential critique of standard economic assumptions as well as of Williamson’s emphasis on 
opportunism. ‘Social ties’ have become a leading theme in the sociology of networks.  
This theme has also permeated managerial sciences, through the analysis of trust. 
Thorelli (1986) defined trust as “an assumption or reliance on the part of A that if either A or 
B encounters a problem in the fulfillment of his/her implicit or explicit transactional 
obligations, B may be counted on to do what A would do if B’s resources would be at A’s 
disposal.” Trust could emerge from prior history, from expectations of continuity, or from the 
interdependence of these two.37  It would operate through: (a) the convergence of expectations 
among partners with different goals; (b) the development of idiosyncratic languages for 
                                                 
37Sako & Helper (1998) identified three sources of trust: contractual (confidence that the other party will carry 
out the agreement); competence (confidence that the other party will be capable of doing what he/she says he/she 
would do); and goodwill (confidence that the other party will take initiatives mutually beneficial while 
restraining from taking unfair advantage). Their test, based on data collected from 3,000 suppliers in the 
automotive industry, showed that Japanese networks of suppliers are significantly more “trusting” than the 
competing US suppliers.  
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carrying routines and information; (c) the transformation of tacit rules in common knowledge 
through shared norms; (d) the adaptation to unforeseen contingencies with reduced transaction 
costs (Jones et al., 1997:  929; Sako & Helper, 1998: 388).  
Williamson (1996, chap. 10) challenged the role of trust, boiling it down to calculative 
strategies. The resulting controversy, which is still going on, exhibited the complex role of 
trust in facilitating flexibility and solving conflicts (Achrol, 1997: 65 sq.). Using an example 
from Uzzi (1997: 55), about a manufacturer in the New York garment industry which moved 
its production to China after having notified its American partners ahead of time to let them 
adjust, while not notifying contractors at arm’s length, Podolny & Page (1998: 61) concluded: 
“Cooperation does not arise as a route to future gains.”  
Economists and organization theorists interpret trust as a reputational issue (MacLeod, 
2007). Reputation draws on various phenomena (Farrel & Scotchmer, 1988; Parkhe, 1993; 
Gulati, 1995b; Adler, 2001; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). It can grow out of: (a) recurrent 
transactions among partners, a central explanation in game theory; (b) familiarity among 
partners sharing a common background, due to social similarities, geographic proximity, or 
devices deliberately designed for that goal (e.g., training sessions, managerial seminars); (c) 
information about past agreements with third parties; (d) institutional roots, as when partners 
belong to professional associations that implement behavioral norms or technical standards.  
More generally, the density of ties likely plays an important role in the decision to go 
hybrid but also in the choice of a specific form. In their survey of over 3,854 strategic 
alliances in biotechnology from 1976 to 1998, Robinson & Stuart (2007) showed that parties 
involved in a dense network (measured by the ‘centrality’ and ‘proximity’ of partners) are  
less likely to rely on equity participation and more likely to rely on extra contractual 
enforcement mechanisms to prevent hold-ups.  However, there might be “a potential dark side 
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of over-embedded ties,” which may sustain relationships that are no longer fruitful (Poppo et 
al., 2008: 52; also Anderson & Jap, 2005).  
IV.4: Implementing control 
 Ties help building a reputation that generates trust, facilitating the selection of 
partners, influencing the choice of the mode of governance, and smoothening adaptation. 
However, hybrids often need more drastic means to control and discipline partners.38 These 
“different safeguards are likely to have different set-up costs and result in different transaction 
costs over different time horizons” (Dyer, 1997: 537). 
The threat to expel underperforming partners or free-riders is such a tool. Threats work 
if the expected losses from being ousted exceed the gains of free-riding (Klein, 1996), and if 
the mode of governance adopted allows such radical sanctions. The implementation of a 
‘private court’ to control and penalize deviant millers illustrates the complex devices that may 
be needed to make threats effective.39 Ostracism in the film industry or the destruction of 
traps of interlopers and deviants in the Maine Lobsters industry provide other examples (Jones 
et al., 1997). Greif (1993; 2005) similarly showed the power and complexity of threats relying 
on collective sanctions in the network of the Maghribi traders.40  
However, threats remain an ambiguous tool. First, a threat is often a one shot game. 
Second, it signals conflicts and difficulties in solving problems, which might tarnish 
reputation and challenge future partnerships. Third, ousting deviants challenge the existence 
of hybrids since they cannot rely on a central ‘entrepreneur’ to monitor such decisions.41  
Contracts may help disciplining free-riders, e.g., imposing penalties or defining conditions 
                                                 
38
 This could signal a difference between relational contracts among firms and within firms: in hybrids, reneging 
threatens the very existence of the agreement; within firms, hierarchy provides the means for dealing with the 
situation. See the comparison between reneging temptations in outsourcing and in the employment relationship 
in Baker et al. (2002) 
39
 Raynaud (1997) emphasizes limits to the threat of expulsion, born out of the internal conflicts that could result 
among remaining partners. Bradach (1997), referring to the example of the “defranchising” of car dealers in the 
US, highlights more the limits resulting from a mix of institutional constraints and the risk of disrupting the 
network. 
40
 See also the role of “merchants’ laws” (Milgrom et al., 1989) 
41
 This is precisely entrepreneurs’ raison d’être, according to Alchian & Demsetz (1972). 
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under which a deviant can be expelled. However, they cannot do it all. In an extensive study 
of over 1,500 alliances, Gulati (1998) exhibited that in taking the decision to cooperate, 
partners are less concerned by contractual hazards than by the expected costs of governing 
their relationship. Brickley & Dark (1987) and Bradach (1997) reached a similar conclusion 
about franchising, and identified various control devices that: (a) limit the discretion of 
agents; (b) reduce opportunistic temptation by restricting residual claims; (c) establish 
benchmarks through company-owned outlets; (d) discipline franchisees through consultants in 
charge of persuading them to remedy violations of standards. Achrol (1997: 64 sq.) suggested 
that control is exercised through expertise, reputation, and influence (which he calls 
“referential”), while Mohr & Spekman (1994) already  pinpointed several techniques 
implemented by hybrids to avoid relying on threat: (a) joint problem-solving devices (e.g., a 
specific committee); (b) persuasion; (c) smoothing; (d) domination; (e) harsh words; and (f) 
arbitration. 
The central lesson of these studies (and several others) is that checking free-riders 
exceeds the capacity of contracts and favors implementing specific control mechanisms, and 
ultimately a governing body. In the long run, the search for stability and the need to fight 
opportunism might well drag hybrids away from quasi-market relationships, towards quasi-
integration. To sum up, the coexistence of pooled resources, autonomous rights, and distinct 
assets is a source of tensions that make devices to sustain hybrids both vulnerable and 
essential. Multi-task models (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) might help managing the 
difficulty. Partners jointly owning some assets while keeping distinct rights on others must 
implement simultaneously joint actions and autonomous or even competing actions that can 
nevertheless benefit from spillover effects. How can parties limit risks that divert some of 
their attention from joint actions or even endorse choices harmful to joint activities? In 
exploring answers to this question, similarities with decision-making in teams and committees 
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are limited. Economic theory does not yet have adequate models to capture how partially 
pooled resources and imperfectly contractible outcomes affect decision process.42  
 
V: GOVERNANCE OF HYBRIDS: A VARIETY OF SOLUTIONS. 
In order to monitor joint assets and create new ones, partners take the risks of exposing shared 
rights to opportunistic behavior, to the point of negative spillover effects.43 The need to 
control and discipline partners to make hybrids sustainable favors governance endowed with 
authority, the intensity of which varies according to the specificity of the assets pooled, the 
allocation of rights, and the incentives at stake. The stability of a hybrid depends on its 
governance, and how appropriate it is to meet the challenges facing it.  
By governance, I understand devices that infuse order in joint activities through the 
allocation of assets and rights, so as to mitigate conflicts while allowing benefits from mutual 
gains (Williamson, 1996: 12). The specificity of governance in hybrids comes from the need 
for parties to coordinate while “partner sovereignty provides a constant strain” (Borys & 
Jemison, 1989: 242).  
As the evidence from previous sections suggests, there are different ways of 
“encompassing the initiation, termination and ongoing relationship maintenance between a set 
of parties” (Heide, 1994: 72). If autonomy characterizes parties operating in markets, while 
administrative coordination prevails in hierarchies, then hybrids mix autonomy and 
cooperation. This mix takes various forms, from tight coordination by a ‘strategic center’ to 
looser ties relying on shared information. In what follows, I focus on three structural 
components of governance and the underlying role of relational contracts. Although these 
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 A stimulating approach to decision-making in complex organizations is proposed by Visser & Swank (2007). 
There are also similarities between decision-making in hybrids and choices in political sciences, with the key 
role of median voters. However, a non-negligible difference is that in many hybrids, ‘voters’ do not have the 
same weight. There are exceptions though, as with the millers or in cooperatives with the “one person one vote” 
rule, which is also a source of problems (Cook & Illiopoulos, 2000; Hendrikse, 2002; Ménard, 2007b). 
43
 For example, in food franchising system spoiled food delivered by a single franchisee might lead to 
destructive externalities throughout the entire network. 
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components combine most of the time, I shall argue (in the next section) that the dominance 
of one component determines the type of hybrid.44 
V.1: Coordinating through a ‘Strategic Center’ 
  Enduring competition among partners and the simultaneous quest for stability favor 
tighter coordination when shared assets and rights become significant. Risks of opportunistic 
behavior need to be circumscribed when strategic decisions must be made jointly among 
otherwise sovereign partners.  This might explain the key role of strong coordinators or 
“strategic centers” in most stable hybrids. 45 
Strategic centers can be understood as a shorthand expression for institutional entities 
under which transactions are initiated, negotiated, monitored, adopted, enforced, and 
terminated.46  The specificity of hybrids is that such centers exert authority on a limited subset 
of rights.  They can constrain partners by: (a) adjusting collective action or joint decision 
rights; (b) designing enforcement mechanisms to discipline parties; (c) framing bargaining 
processes over quasi-rents; and (d) deciding dispute resolution procedures. Examples are 
provided by the millers’ Board, assemblies ruling condominiums (Klein et al. 1978) or groups 
of producers (Sauvée 2002), as well as boards monitoring joint ventures.  
First, strategic centers shape collective actions by monitoring joint decision rights. 
Thorelli (1986) referred to ‘power’, understood as “the ability to influence the decisions or 
actions of others.” Ménard (1996, 1997, 2004) developed the concept of “authority” to 
capture the delegation of subsets of decision rights to an entity that is formally (and most of 
the time legally) distinct, with the power to discipline parties when it comes to joint actions. 
‘Authority’ differs from ‘hierarchy’ in that it relies on consent rather than command, 
                                                 
44
 See also Hendrikse (2002). Bradach & Eccles (1989) argued early on that three basic control mechanisms 
govern transactions within and among firms: price, authority, and trust. The difference among modes of 
organization would depend on the prevalence of one mechanism over the others.  
45
 I retroactively discovered that Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller (1995) also referred to ‘strategic centers’ as 
coordinating devices. 
46
 This definition is adapted from Palay (1984: 265) 
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maintaining some symmetry among holders of rights. In hybrids, authority is built through: 
(a) control over the allocation of pooled resources; (b) the development of shared 
competences; (c) the provision of expertise; (d) the creation of a sense of common purpose; 
and (e) legitimization through social acceptance.  
Second, authority requires enforcement. Interpreting Williamson (1985), Park (1996) 
suggested that enforcement differs whether operating in bilateral or trilateral arrangements. 
In the former, parties enforce decisions through negotiations since in the last resort decisions 
remain in the hands of parent firms, as in joint ventures. When actions become more 
intertwined and/or the network extensive internal transactions and joint decisions on 
monitoring and enforcement become increasingly complex. As a result, coordination requires 
trilateral governance, with enforcement transferred to a well-identified entity, e.g., a 
professional staff or a central management that can select collective actions, evaluate 
performance, and penalize deviants.47 Professional sports leagues or the millers illustrate the 
point. 
Third, ‘authority’ allows strategic centers to frame the bargaining process. Ménard 
(1996) examined how a group of producers in the poultry industry implemented a central 
entity in charge of organizing negotiations among partners as well as the bargaining process 
with distributors. Analyzing the success of Saveol, a network of producers of high quality 
vegetables, Sauvée (2002) described an arrangement in which small owners delegate 
substantial decision rights to two distinct cooperatives that themselves delegate rights to two 
joint ventures, in charge of controlling inputs, developing products, and marketing them. 
However, the delegation of rights over a limited subset of assets raises a difficult trade-off for 
hybrids, namely: how to keep the arrangement adaptable through the transfer of adequate 
authority while keeping holders of this authority under control. This difficulty may explain 
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 “The central management has decision-making power over members and it monitors the members’ 
cooperation activities and imposes sanctions, if necessary.” (Park, 1996: 812) 
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why so many inter-firm agreements place a “high premium on personnel with long memories, 
sound hearts, and a penchant for looking both ways before crossing the street” (Palay, 1985: 
164).  
Fourth, the existence of multiple sources of tensions (see IV.1) favors the adoption of 
formalized mechanisms to solve disputes within the strategic center or between the center and 
its constituencies. In their study of the US hardware industry, Dwyer & Oh (1988) suggested 
that formal procedures might prevail over centralization and participation in differentiating 
modes of organization.48  The development of routines that codify links among partners and 
serialize the decision process helps reducing disputes and/or facilitating their resolution. The 
implementation of transmission channels that facilitate control, e.g., automated management 
information systems, can similarly help formalizing relationships. Detailed technical 
appendixes to contracts also frame disputes and renegotiations among partners. Policing 
devices, such as “mystery shoppers” in franchises or field audits and internal inspections in 
the millers’ case, similarly ease identifying and redressing deviant behavior. Enforcement 
procedures might go even further, implementing ‘private courts’ to ‘judge’ and ‘discipline’ 
deviant partners (see the millers, or the now classical analysis of ‘merchant laws’ in 
Champagne fairs in Milgrom et al. , 1989).  
Numerous empirical studies (e.g., Brown, 1984; Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995; 
2002b; Ménard, 1996, 2004; Ménard & Raynaud, 2010) confirm this role of ‘authority’ 
delegated to, and implemented by a strategic center.49  They are in line with what transaction 
cost economics predicts: the more strategic the rights and assets shared the more formal the 
governance becomes. 
V.2: Third parties as ordering forces 
                                                 
48
 ‘Formalization’ has become a standard variable differentiating arrangement in organization theory. 
49
 From a different perspective, Bradach (1997) noted that franchise systems also develop forms of strategic 
control to overcome agency problems, e.g., combining a large monolithic hierarchy (company-owned units) and 
a federation of semi-autonomous hierarchies (e.g., KFC, in which 17 actors owned half of all franchisees in 
1989). 
41 
 
Strategic centers shape decisions from within, ideally making agreements self-
sustainable. In last resort they remain offshoots of parent companies. Because they get their 
authority from delegation, they depend on the commitment of their constituencies and remain 
directly exposed to risks of opportunism. To confront these difficulties, hybrids might turn to 
exogenous entities to facilitate coordination and discipline partners, either because shared 
rights are not strategic enough to justify joint authority or because the impulse to cooperate 
comes from parties external to the relationship (e.g., public policies). These ordering forces 
can be public or private.  
Public authorities can interfere directly in the development of hybrids through agencies, 
regulations, etc. In the French poultry industry, a quality certification system initiated by 
small producers was later formalized, on their demand, with the legal creation of ‘certifying 
organizations’. These are governed by representatives from the government and the sector, as 
well by independent ‘experts’, and they have been key to the success of ‘red label’ products 
(Ménard, 1996). Another example are Research and Development projects that depend on 
subsidies conditional to inter-firm agreements, as with the European Galileo project, which is 
building a satellite positioning-system to compete with the United States’ GPS. Lastly, public 
authorities can provide indirect incentives to cooperate, as when they ease access to scientific 
poles or technology parks to firms accepting to interact. 
External monitoring of hybrids can also depend on private entities. Formal procedures 
can be embedded in arrangements to smoothen adaptation, such as when adjustments are 
delegated to identifiable arbitrators (often lawyers or experts) or to professional associations. 
In the French beef industry, privately-initiated networks turned early to professional trade 
associations to solve conflicts and enforce agreements (Mazé & Ménard, 2010). However, 
partners often prefer less formal devices, and refer to mediators to adapt their relationships 
(Rubin, 2005). Ryall & Sampson (2006) go even further, showing how partners may plan 
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penalties for those who become confrontational. One problem that researchers confront in 
identifying these devices is the difficulty of collecting information about the private 
monitoring of adaptation and conflicts.50 
Last, numerous hybrids find support in mixed entities, in which private agents and 
public representatives jointly make decisions. Under the pressure of the competition 
authorities of the European Union, who considered the initial arrangement as collusive, the 
‘certifying organizations’ mentioned above are now autonomous entities, in many cases with 
representatives from the private and public sectors while others are entirely private (Ménard 
& Valceschini, 2005; Raynaud et al., 2009).  
However, the monitoring of hybrids by external actors runs into severe limitations. It 
entails problems of verifiability by third parties, a serious constraint in arrangements that 
maintain substantial rights separate and/or organize complex transactions. Implementing 
decisions by exogenous entities might also have dissuasive costs, involve unacceptable 
delays, or require controls that are hardly tolerable. Several studies suggest that these 
obstacles are better overcome through informal safeguards, which lower transaction costs and 
which are hardly imitable by competitors (Gulati, 1995a; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Robinson & 
Stuart, 2007). 
V.3: Shared information 
Asymmetric information is a major source of opportunism in hybrids. Of course 
information problems plague all modes of organization. They are amplified in hybrids 
because existing assets and rights are partly shared while new assets and rights are created 
that can hardly be attributed to specific contributions. Moreover, the autonomy of partners 
                                                 
50
 Lumineau & Oxley (2008) provide a rare analysis of the private resolution of conflicts, through arbitration, 
mediation, or negotiated settlement. They examined 102 contractual conflicts in which lawyers intervened, 
involving 178 firms operating in manufacturing and retail sectors, from 1991 to 2005, and showed that 41 
conflicts were solved this way, while the remaining 61 ended in the courts. 
43 
 
prevents hierarchical solutions, while overlapping assets and rights require more information 
than market prices offer.  
Relevant information might be collected through repeated transactions (Gulati, 
1995b); or through appropriate information systems, e.g., integrated logistics, shared 
transportation facilities, common buying procedures, joint collection of data on customers, 
and so forth (Clemons & Row, 1992; Ménard, 1996, 2003). Using their dataset from alliances 
between biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, Robinson & Stuart (2007) refer to networks 
as platforms disseminating information, thus reducing uncertainty and benefiting from shared 
capabilities. New information technologies might help, although data are inconclusive about 
whether they favor inter-firm agreements or integration, e.g., in the trucking industry. 
Following Arrow (1974), Heiman & Nickerson (2002) emphasize the role of physical 
channels linking partners. ‘High bandwidth channels’, e.g., co-location, would allow rich 
interfaces among partners, facilitating coordination but also raising problems of delineation 
and enforcement of rights over tacit knowledge; ‘low bandwidth channels’, e.g., e-mails or 
faxes, would reduce contractual hazards but restrict transfers of information.  
In all cases, information devices intend to make partnerships sustainable by reducing 
risks of opportunism, facilitating mutual control, and lowering transaction costs. Shared 
information can help reaching these goals through: (a) modularity and replicability of know-
how, which allow implementing joint routines; (b) open standards, which make 
communication easier while increasing the transparency of transactions; (c) implementation 
of devices that allow conversion and translation of protocols and interfaces at low cost; (d) the 
development of ‘intuitive’ interfaces (Langlois, 2002; Clemons & Row, 1992; Paché & 
Paraponaris, 1993; Anderson & Gatignon, 2005).  
 The literature on the role of information in the governance of hybrids and how it 
might differentiate them from other modes of organization remains surprisingly poor. Powell 
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(1990; also Powell et al. 1996), using data from the biotechnology sector, has suggested that 
information in networks is “thicker” and “freer” than in hierarchies, while it requires 
reciprocity that does not fit arms’ length relationships of the market type. This remains an 
interesting intuition, to be explored further.  
V.4: Underlying it all: contracts 
In most hybrids, governance is at least partially framed by contracts. This provides a 
strong argument to examine hybrids through contractual lenses. Contracts are powerful tools, 
facilitating coordination as well as control. However, their role should not be overemphasized. 
Macaulay (1963) already noted that they primarily supply frameworks within which other 
devices prosper. Since the analysis of contracts plays an important role in this book, I 
hereafter focus solely on issues of particular relevance for the analysis of hybrids.51 
Ideally, partners would rely on self-enforcing contracts, embedded in formal 
safeguards that keep calculative parties within the range delineated by the agreement or in 
social norms pervasive enough to discipline them (Ouchi, 1980; Artz & Brush, 2000). As 
argued by Klein (1996; also Baker et al., 2002: 40, and Maze & Ménard, 2010) even when 
outcomes are not verifiable by a third party and prohibitively costly to specify ex-ante, no one 
may wish to renege if the expected value of the future relationship is sufficiently large. 
However, theoretical insights on the importance of non-contractible elements as well 
as empirical studies on contractual flaws demonstrate the limited role of contracts. The 
complex overlapping of autonomy and cooperation in hybrids make contracts typically 
relational.52 Changing market conditions, uncertainties surrounding the outcome of joint 
projects, measurement problems, ill-defined property rights and/or weak institutions making 
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 For a detailed review of contracts in inter-firm relations, see Lafontaine & Slade (2011) and Malcomson 
(2011, sections 8 and 9). Hansmann (2011) also discusses related issues. 
52
 See Rey & Tirole (2001: 25-26): “there is little point writing a detailed contract that protects the partners by 
reducing potential externalities and specific covenants restricting the set of possible actions. Partners are already 
protected by their control rights; and such contractual features, which are pervasive under undivided control, 
only serve to reduce incentives without improving efficiency. Joint ventures may also want to shut down the 
partners’ otherwise desirable outside opportunities in order to foster their commitment to the joint venture.” 
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enforcement dubious, are all factors motivating flexibility and the potentially positive effects 
of renegotiations.53 These problems are not exclusive to hybrids. The specificities of  
contracts in hybrids lies in the amplitude of adjustment variables and the room left for 
relational adaptation, a point already noticed by Borys & Jemison (1989: 243) and 
emphasized by Robinson & Stuart (2007) in their examination of alliances in biotechnology. 
Ryall & Sampson (2006) exhibit how the resulting heterogeneity in contractual clauses 
coagulates in ‘boilerplate terms’, motivated by the need to facilitate adjustments when hybrids 
face knowledge leakages or inefficiencies in dispute resolution devices.54  
Non-contractibilities translate in out-of-contract adjustments. Already in 1984, Brown 
noted that in networks “the contract itself is more a formalization of an understanding than it 
is a legally-enforceable obligation” (p. 266). Breaches of contracts are rarely taken to court, 
even in the litigious US. This means that a contract can be renegotiated (or ignored) if needs 
arise and the contingent claims problems are thereby avoided.” Almost simultaneously, Palay 
(1984) showed in a detailed study of 51 transactions between rail freight carriers and shippers, 
that if sticking to clauses or adjusting only at the margin prevailed in non-specific 
transactions, adjustments exceeding the terms of contracts dominated idiosyncratic 
transactions. Similar observations have been made in franchises, in which contractual 
provisions define only a framework (Bradach, 1997), or in strategic alliances, in which 
contracts operate primarily as facilitating devices. Grandori & Cacciatori (2006; also Grandori 
& Furlotti, 2006) showed in a survey of alliances motivated by innovation that contracts are 
typically simple and short (7-8 pages long), with clauses focused on a few core issues, mainly 
the assignment of property rights, while decisions on tasks and process are left aside. In their 
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 The idea that contracts are deliberately left open goes back to Simon (1951), but still faces resistance (see 
Tirole, 1999). For the potentially positive role of renegotiation, see Estache and Quesada, who already discussed 
the issue in 2002. 
54
 These ‘regularities’ concern: 1) provisions concerning confidentiality; (2) the right to terminate through 
bankruptcy or change key management; (3) limitations of liability; and (4) arbitration provisions. Numerous 
contracts explicitly waive firm rights to bring disputes before the courts or other administrative bodies (Ryall & 
Sampson, 2006) or restrict the temptation to go to arbitration (e.g., clauses specifying that arbitration should be 
in the language and country of the partner NOT bringing the dispute).  
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study of 42 R & D alliances in the telecoms equipment and microelectronics industry, Ryall & 
Samson (2006) substantiate the role of contracts as blueprints which help plans for 
collaboration, which set partners’ expectations, and which reduce misunderstanding and 
costly missteps. Moreover, similar contracts might carry different meanings according to their 
environment. In a survey of carmaker suppliers in Japan and the US, Sako & Helper (1998) 
demonstrate that American suppliers use long term contracts as a protection against 
opportunism by their customers, while Japanese suppliers view long term contracts as 
signalling opportunistic customers! 
In sum, contracts are only one, though a structuring  element of the governance of 
hybrids among a whole set of devices. The combination of these devices likely explains the 
variety of hybrids, while the prevalence of one of them would account for the subset to which 
an actual hybrid belongs.   
 
VI. TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF HYBRIDS 
Many economists are doubtful about the relevance of establishing a typology of organizations, 
although lessons from the history of sciences suggest otherwise.55  Having described hybrids 
as a class of their own, Rubin (1978: 232) nevertheless concluded “the franchisee is in fact 
closer to being an employee of the franchisor than to being an independent entrepreneur.”  
Cheung (1983: 1) went a step further, arguing that firms and other arrangements are simply 
shorthand descriptions of ways to organize activities through contracts.  Williamson initially 
considered these ‘intermediate’ forms as unstable and transitory (1975: 109), while Masten 
(as late as 1996) argued that “their form must be assessed on a case-by-case basis” (1996:12). 
True, the variety of observable forms suggests a continuum of arrangements between 
‘markets’ and ‘hierarchies’. On the other hand, when we examine, say, joint ventures, we are 
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 Developing appropriate classifications played a major role in natural sciences (Linnaeus), chemistry 
(Mendeleev), medical sciences (nosology), etc. 
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aware of looking at something different from franchising or supply chain systems. It may thus 
be asked whether a classification of hybrids is possible without flattening their 
characteristics?56   
VI.1: Alternative approaches 
Numerous studies have provided affirmative answers to this question.  They have either used 
criteria derived from organization theory, with an emphasis on: (a) the coordination 
mechanisms involved; (b) the degree of centralization;  and (c) the formalization of decision 
making; or from transaction cost economics, with a key role given to the specificity of the 
investments involved and, to a lesser extent, the uncertainty surrounding the transactions at 
stake.  
By stressing coordination, Grandori & Soda (1995) classified “inter-firm networks” 
as:  social networks, relying on personalized relationships (e.g., industrial districts);  
bureaucratic networks, obeying formal rules (e.g., franchises); and proprietary networks, 
based on cross-holding property rights (e.g., joint ventures).57 Sauvée (2002) categorized 
hybrids according to whether the allocation of decision rights requires horizontal or vertical 
coordination. Park (1996) differentiated forms according to their degree of centralization, with 
alliances, voluntary, and mandatory trilateral agreements as the main categories. More 
recently, Carson et al. (2006) argued that uncertainty should be the key variable for 
classifying inter-firm contracts as formal or relational.58   
                                                 
56
 Biology provides a useful analogy here: the discovery that all living organisms share common characteristics, 
such as cells, did not eliminate the usefulness of identifying distinct species. At the end of the day, what matters 
are the advantages and disadvantages brought on by reducing the spectrum of organizational forms to discrete 
‘bands’. In my view the exercise plays a positive role in: (1) forcing the distillation of properties of classes and 
subclasses to a small number of determinants; (2) helping to identify flaws and “black holes” in our theories of 
organizations. 
57
 Their typology also differentiates subclasses depending on whether relationships are symmetric or asymmetric. 
58
 Between markets adapted to weakly specific assets, and hierarchies prevailing when specificity is high, 
arrangements would vary according to the type of uncertainty, with formal contracts being more efficient when 
the ‘ambiguity’ related to measurement problems is high, while relational contracts are more efficient when 
‘volatility’ is high. 
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Endorsing a transaction cost perspective, Oxley (1997) identified three types of hybrid 
arrangements according to how they deal with contractual hazards and appropriability: 
unilateral contracts (e.g., licensing), close to markets although poorly adapted to strong 
hazards; bilateral contracts (e.g., technology sharing agreements), with more committed 
parties although exposed to ex-post haggling or third party adjudicative costs in solving 
conflicts; and quasi-integrated equity-based alliances in which partners share resources, 
organizational routines, and communication methods, but must deal with costly monitoring 
and control. Gulati & Singh (1998) have argued that anticipated coordination costs, not 
appropriation, determine organizational choices, since they delineate the authority acceptable 
by autonomous partners and the role of trust in alleviating costs.59 Using a dataset on 
alliances, they differentiated: (a) contractual alliances, with no shared ownership but joint 
activities coordinated through negotiations (e.g., distribution agreements); (b) minority 
alliances, in which one or several partners take minority equity, so that (weak) hierarchical 
relationships develop (e.g., participation in the Board); (c) joint ventures, with an independent 
command structure that internalizes pricing, operating procedures, and dispute resolution. 
More recently, Baker et al. (2008) characterized the variety of governance structures 
according to the allocation of asset ownership, decision rights, and payoffs. Their typology 
runs from mergers and acquisitions to total divestitures, with intermediate agreements 
(licensing, alliances, and franchising, etc.) when some decision rights and/or payoff rights are 
contracted, with parties abandoning part of their autonomy in exchange of expected 
spillovers.   
VI.2: A Governance perspective 
                                                 
59
 “By coordination costs, we mean the anticipated organizational complexity of decomposing tasks among 
partners along with ongoing coordination of activities to be completed jointly or individually across 
organizational boundaries and the related extent of communication and decisions that would be necessary” 
(p. 782). They tested their hypothesis with a multinomial logistic regression on a sample of 1,570 alliances 
involving U.S., European and Japanese firms from 1970 to 1989, in three sectors (bio-pharmacy, new materials, 
and automobiles). 
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Building on these contributions and based on the variables examined in the previous sections, 
I propose a typology that encapsulates these variables as instruments shaping the outcome, 
that is: the prevailing mode of governance. The underlying logic is that forces favoring a 
‘hybrid’ on the one hand, and strategic choices commanding the degree of centralization 
needed to provide sustainability on the other hand, result in various governance structures. 
 If we contrast hybrids with the two standard polar cases of ‘pure’ markets, with 
autonomy of strategic resources and rights and decentralized coordination as key 
characteristics, and ‘pure’ hierarchy, with strategic assets and rights unified under a 
centralized entity in charge of their allocation and control in the last resort, we can 
substantiate our simplified Figure 1 (Section II).  
 To meet uncertainty and complexity through arrangements that allow the creation of 
extra value, organizations need to share rules which maintain cohesiveness.  The intensity of 
these forces, which imply endorsing specific modes of governance, translates into the variable 
density of pooled, strategic rights and resources (horizontal axis). On the other hand, the 
sustainability of an arrangement requires instruments for checking on partners eager to 
preserve their autonomy, with various solutions determining the degree of 
control/coordination at hand (vertical axis).  The outcome is the variety of arrangements 
summarized in Figure 2, in which the upper frontier relating the two axes captures what 
would be ‘pure’ modes of governance.  
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Figure 2: The Typology of Hybrids 
 The perspective adopted here builds on the Coase/Williamson tradition, with hybrids 
located between spot markets and hierarchies. In the former, autonomous parties appropriate 
the benefits of their own actions, and deliberate coordination is at its lowest; whereas 
hierarchies capitalize on the coordination and control of common resources and rights, while 
considerably reducing the autonomy of insiders and their capacity to appropriate surpluses 
privately. In the hybrid zone, we find the variety of answers to the issue of governance, 
according to the prevalence of one of the devices identified in Section V. The more partners 
expect from pooling resources, the more autonomy they will be ready to sacrifice with respect 
to their decision right and their property rights, up to the point where rights are fully 
integrated. Symmetrically, the more coordination is needed to maintain the stability of an 
arrangement, the more centralized the monitoring and control of that arrangement will be.  
On the left of the spectrum, close to spot markets, information-based networks rely 
essentially on information platforms to coordinate activity, while ownership over assets and 
decision rights remains distinct, so that payoffs are closely linked to the actions of separate 
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parties. Porous frontiers and continuous exchanges among biotech firms in the Boston area or 
among information technology firms in the Silicon Valley, as well as forms of consumers’ 
associations provide illustrations.60 At the other end of the spectrum, partners rely on tight 
coordination by strategic centers empowered with formal authority, contractual clauses 
constraining members who pool significant rights, while appropriation of residual gains 
becomes a key issue. Joint ventures in R & D projects or the millers’ case illustrate this point. 
In between, we find arrangements in which partners keep control over the hard core of their 
assets, although they develop non-negligible relationship-specific investments. Such 
arrangements tend to rely on third parties to monitor tensions and coordinate efforts, whether 
the third party is a public entity, as agencies monitoring part of the “label” system in the 
French agri-business; or a private arbitraging entity, jointly agreed upon and in charge of 
filling in blanks in contracts, as in many strategic alliances.  
However, as argued in this chapter, organizations rarely find themselves on the 
optimal frontier. Since non-contractible rights are significant most of the time, the autonomy 
of parties and their rights impose constraints on arrangements, as relational contracts are at the 
core of hybrids. The lens-shaped area captures the idea of a tolerance/acceptance zone that 
allows adjustment and adaptation among partners. The lower bound delineates the inferior 
limit of what is acceptable to parties. Hence, the shaded area is where modes of governance 
operate most of the time  
Most hybrids fall under one of the three types identified in the graph, according to the 
governing device that prevails. However, devices often overlap, ‘polluting’ pure types. The 
dotted line separating types of hybrids suggests this permeability.  Indeed, one advantage of 
this typology is to help understanding why and how arrangements often grouped under the 
same umbrella, e.g., franchises or cooperatives, actually take many different forms according 
                                                 
60
 Recent studies suggest that networks can be more formal than expected. In their work on the biotechnology 
sector, Robinson and Stuart (2007) show that centrality in the network and proximity to potential partners give 
powerful means to some firms, facilitating control, and reducing the need to hold property rights.  
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to the activities they coordinate or the strategies they pursue, notwithstanding similarities in 
the transactions they organize. This richness results from: (1) the complex forces that explain 
the existence of hybrids and delineate the acceptance zone within which they operate; (2) the 
trade-offs hybrids continuously face in organizing transactions along non-standard procedures 
intended to maintain cohesion and stability in the partnership.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The central lesson of this chapter is that “[t]here is an increasing sense that the network of 
relationships in which particular exchanges are embedded have properties that are greater than 
the sum of its parts and outcomes that cannot be explained by studying its parts alone” 
(Achrol, 1997: 63). Hybrids are ‘institutional structures of production’ with characteristics of 
their own. They resort to specific governing devices developed to deal with: (1) property 
rights that ultimately remain distinct, although significant assets are pooled; (2) decision 
rights that keep partners independent, although shared rights restrict their autonomy; and (3) 
the need to design adequate incentives in a context in which frontiers among residual 
claimants are blurred. Hybrids proliferate because advantages of coordination and cooperation 
overcome gains associated with market competition, while remaining autonomous provides 
more flexibility and better incentives than an integrated structure can offer.  
The existence and characteristics of hybrids are substantiated by an abundant 
empirical literature. However, explanatory theories remain underdeveloped. Models are 
needed that would capture the role and richness of these arrangements in market economies. 
We also lack adequate data for estimating the weight and dynamics of these forms in modern 
capitalism. Five unsolved problems deserve a particular attention in my view. First, we need 
to understand why hybrids often co-exist with integrated firms. Second, we still remain in the 
dark with respect to the exact weight of these arrangements in the production and distribution 
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of goods and services. Third, we do not well understand the role of technological changes, 
e.g., ICT, in the evolution of their governance. Fourth, the interaction of hybrids with their 
institutional environment (e.g., rules governing property rights) requires in-depth studies. 
Last, several characteristics of hybrids challenge competition policies, which remain largely 
grounded in theories built on the simplistic trade-off between markets and firms, so that 
substantial revision of these policies is likely to be required.   
 These issues only define part of the rich research agenda opened up by the 
acknowledgement that hybrid arrangements may be the normal and prevailing way of doing 
business in modern market economies. 
 
REFERENCES 
Achrol, Ravi S. [1997]  « Changes in the Theory of Interorganizational Relations in 
Marketing : Toward a Network Paradigm » Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 25 
(1): 56-71  
 
Adler, Paul S. [2001] “Market, hierarchy, and trust: the knowledge economy and the future of 
capitalism”. Organization Science 12 (2): 214-234  
 
Alchian, Armen A. [1987], “Property Rights,” pp. 1031-1034 in: John Eatwell, Murrell 
Milgate and Peter Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave, vol. 3, MacMillan: London.  
 
-- &  Harold Demsetz [1972]  "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization". 
American Economic Review, 62 (5): 777-795. 
 
Anderson, Erin [1985], “The Salesperson as Outside Agent or Employee? A Transaction Cost 
Analysis,” Marketing Science, 4 (3): 234-254. 
 
Anderson, Erin & Hubert Gatignon [2005] “Firms and the Creation of New Markets”. In C. 
Ménard & M. Shirley (eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlin-Dordrecht-
New York: Springer. chap. 16: 401-431 
 
Anderson, Erin & Sandy D. Jap [2005] “The Dark Side of Close Relationship.” Sloan 
Management Review. 46 (3): 75-82 
 
Aoki, Masahiko [2001] Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge 
(MA). 
 
Arrow, Kenneth [1974] The Limits of Organization. New York: Norton and Co. 
 
54 
 
Artz, Kendall W. and Thomas S. Brush  [2000] “Asset Specificity, Uncertainty and Relational 
Norms: An Examination of Coordination Costs in Collaborative Strategic Alliances”. Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 41 (4): 337-362 
 
Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy [2002], ‘Relational Contracts and the 
Theory of the Firm’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (1): 39-84.  
 
-- [2008]  “Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between “Islands of Conscious Power”. Journal of 
the Japanese and International Economies 22 (2):  146-163. 
 
Barnett, William P.  1990  "The Organizational Ecology of Technological System". 
Administrative Science Quarterly. 35 (1): 31-60.  
 
Barnett, William P. and Glenn Carroll  1993 "How Institutional Constraints Affected the 
Organization of the Early American Telephone Industry". Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization. 9 (1): 98-127.  
 
Ben-Porath, Yoram [1980], "The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the 
Organization of Exchange," Population and Development Review, 6 (1): 1-30.  
Bleeke, Joel & David Ernst (eds.) [1993] Collaborating to Compete: Using Strategic 
Alliances and Acquisitions in the Global Marketplace. New York: John Wiley & Sons 
Blois, Keith .J. [1972] “Vertical Quasi-Integration”. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 20 
(3): 253-272 
Borys, Bryan & David B. Jemison [1989]  “Hybrid Arrangements as Strategic Alliances: 
Theoretical Issues in Organizational Combinations”,  Academy of Management Review, 14 
(2): 234-249. 
 
Bradach Jeffrey. L. [1997], “Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 276-303.  
 
Bradach, Jeffrey L. & Robert G. Eccles [1989], "Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal 
Types to Plural Forms,” pp. 97-118 in: R. Scott (ed.),  Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 15. 
 
Brickley, James A. [1999], “Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from 
Franchising,” Journal of Law and Economics, 42: 745-774.  
 
– – & Frederick H. Dark [1987], "The Choice of Organizational Form: the Case of 
Franchising," Journal of Financial Economics. 18 (2): 401-420.  
 
Brown, Wilson B. [1984], “Firm-Like Behavior in Markets. The Administered Channel,” 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2: 263-276.  
 
Carson, Stephen J., Anoop Madhok & Tao Wu [2006] “Uncertainty, Opportunism, and 
Governance: The Effects of Volatility and Ambiguity on Formal and Relational Contracts”. 
Academy of Management Journal 40 (5): 1058-1077  
 
55 
 
Cheung, Steven N.S. [1983], “The Contractual Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26 (1): 1-22.  
 
Clemons, Eric K. & Michael C. Row  1992  "Information Technology and Industrial 
Cooperation: The Changing Economics of Coordination and Ownership". Journal of 
Management Information System. 9 (2): 9-28. 
 
Coase, Ronald  H.  [1937] “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 2 (1):  386-405.  
 
-- [1992], "The Institutional Structure of Production," American Economic Review, 82 (4): 
713-719.  
 
Cohen, Wesley M. & Daniel A. Levintha [1990]  "Absoptive Capacity: A New perspective on 
Learning and Innovation". Administrative Science Quarterly. 35 (1): 128-152. 
 
Cook, Michael L. & Constantine  Iliopoulos [2000] “Ill-defined Property Rights in Collective 
Action: The Case of US Agricultural Cooperatives.” In C. Ménard (ed.) Institutions, 
Contracts and Organizations. Perspectives from New Institutional Economics. Cheltenham: 
E. Elgar: 335-348. 
 
 
Dwyer, F. Robert & Sajo Oh [1988], “A Transaction Cost Perspective on Vertical Contractual 
Structure and Interchannel Competitive Strategies,” Journal of Marketing, 52: 21-34.  
 
Dyer, Jeffrey H. [1997], “Effective Interfirm Collaboration: How Firms Minimize Transaction 
Costs and Maximize Transaction Value,” Strategic Management Journal, 18 (7): 535-556.  
 
Dyer, Jeffrey H. and Habir Singh  [1998]  “The relational view: cooperative strategy and 
sources of interorganizational competitive advantage” Academy of Management Review, 23 
(4): 660-679. 
 
Eccles, Robert G. [1981], "The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry," Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 2 (4): 335-357.  
 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. & Michael. Bognanno (1990) “The Incentive Effects of Tournaments 
Revisited: Evidence from the PGA Tour”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 43 (3): 74-
88 
 
Estache, Antonio and Lucia Quesada [2002] “Concession Contract Renegotiations: Some 
Efficiency vs. Equity Dilemmas”. World Bank Policy Research, WP 2705. 
 
Farrell, Joseph & Susan Scotchmer [1988], "Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 103: 279-297.  
 
Fehr Ernst and Schmidt, Karl M. (1999), “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and 
Cooperation”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3): 817-868.  
 
Ghosh, Mrinal & George John [1999], “Governance Value Analysis and Marketing Strategy,” 
Journal of Marketing 63: 131-145. 
 
56 
 
Goldberg, Victor P. [1980], "Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts," 
American Behavioral Scientist, 23 (3): 337-352.  
 
Grandori, Anna & Eugenia Cacciatori [2006] “From Relational to Constitutional Contracting: 
The Case of Project-based Strategic Alliances.” WP, Università Bocconi. 14 pages.  
 
Grandori, Anna & Mario Furlotti [2006] ‘The bearable lightness of alliances: associational 
and procedural contracts’. In A. Arino and J.Reuer (eds.) Strategic alliances: Governance and 
Contracts. London (UK): Palgrave 
 
Grandori, Anna & Giuseppe Soda [1995], “Inter-firm Networks : Antecedents, Mechanisms 
and Forms” Organization Studies, 16 (2): 183-214  
 
Granovetter, Mark [1985] "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness". American Journal of Sociology. 91 (3): 481-510. 
 
Greif, Avner [1993] “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions In Early Trade: The 
Maghribi Traders” American Economic Review. 83 (3): 525-547 
 
Greif, Avner [2005] “Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of 
Institutions Supporting Exchanges”. In Ménard & Shirley (eds.), chap. 28: 727-786 
 
Gulati, Ranjay  [1995a] “Does Familiarity Breeds Trust? The Implication of Repeated Ties 
for Contractual Choice in Alliances”. Academy of Management Journal, 38 (1): 85-112 
 
Gulati, Ranjay  [1995b]  « Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns : a Longitudinal 
Analysis ». Administrative Science Quarterly, 40 (4): 619-652.  
 
Gulati, Ranjay [1998] “Alliances and Networks,” Strategic Management Journal, 19: 293-
317.  
 
Gulati, Ranjav & Martin Gargiulo [1999] “Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come 
From”? American Journal of Sociology, 104 (5): 1439-1493  
 
Gulati, Ranjay , Nitin Nohria & Akbar Zaheir [2000] “Strategic Networks”. Strategic 
Management Journal, 21: 203-215 
 
Gulati, Ranjay & Harber Singh [1998], “The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing 
Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 43: 781-814  
 
Hakansson, H. [1989] Corporate Technological Behavior, Cooperation and Network. 
London: Routledge 
 
Hakansson, Hakan & Jan Johansson  [1993]  “The Network as a Governance Structure: 
Interfirm Cooperation Beyond Markets and Hierarchies”. In G. Grabher (ed.) The Embedded 
Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Networks. London: Routledge: 35-51 
 
Halonen, Maija [2002] "Reputation and the Allocation of Ownership", Economic Journal, 
112: 539-558. 
57 
 
 
Hansmann, Henry [1988] « The Ownership of the Firm », Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization, 4 (2): 267-304.  
 
- [2011] “Ownership and Organizational Form.” In R. Gibbons & J. Roberts (eds.) Handbook 
of Organizational Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. YY 
 
Hart, Oliver & John Moore [1990] "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm". Journal of 
Political Economy, 98 (6): 1119-1158 
 
Heide, Jan B. [1994] “Interorganizational Governance in Marketing Channels”. Journal of 
Marketing. 58: 71-85  
 
Heide, Jan B. & George John [1992] “Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships?” 
Journal of Marketing 56 (April): 32-44 
 
Heiman, Bruce & Jack A. Nickerson [2002], “Towards Reconciling Transaction Cost 
Economics and the Knowledge-Based View of the Firm: The Context of Interfirm 
Collaboration,” International Journal of the Economics of Business, 9 (1): 97-116.  
 
Helper, Susan & David I. Levine [1992], "Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product Market 
Structure," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 8 (3), 561-581.  
 
Hendrikse, George [2002] “The Governance of Networks”. WP, Erasmus Universiteit. 32 
pages.  
 
Hennart, Jean François [1988], "A Transaction Costs Theory of Equity Joint Ventures," 
Strategic Management Journal, 9: 361-374. 
 
Hergert, M. and D. Morris [1988] “Trends in International Collaborative Agreements”, in 
F.K.Contractor and P. Lorange, Cooperative Strategies in International Business, Lexington 
(MA): Lexington Books: 99-110 
 
Hodgson, G. [2002], “The Legal Nature of the Firm and the Myth of the Firm-Market 
Hybrid,” International Journal of the Economics of Business, 9(1): 37-60 
 
Holmstrom, Bengt [1989)] "Agency Costs and Innovation", Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization. 12 (3): 305-327.   
 
-- [1999], ‘The Firm as a Subeconomy’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15 (1): 
74–102. 
 
Holmstrom, Bengt & Paul Milgrom [1991] "Multi-task Principal-Agent Analysis". Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization. 7 (Sp):  24-52 
 
Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts [1998], “The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited,” Journal 
of Economic Perspective, 12 (4): 73-94.  
 
58 
 
John, George & Barton A. Weitz [1988], “Forward Integration into Distribution: An 
Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 
4 (2): 337-355.  
 
Jones, Candace, William S. Hesterly & Stephen P. Borgatti  [1997]  “A General Theory of 
Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms.” Academy of 
Management Review, 22 (4): 911-945 
 
Jorde Thomas M. & David J. Teece [1989], “Competition and Cooperation: Striking the Right 
Balance,” California Management Review, Spring: 25-37.  
 
Joshi, Ashwin & Rodney L. Stump [1999] “Transaction Cost Analysis: Integration, of Recent 
Refinements and an Empirical Test”, Journal of Business- to- Business Marketing, 5 (4): 33-
71  
 
Khanna, Tarun  [1998],  “The Scope of Alliances,” Organization Science, 9 (3): 340-355.  
 
Klein, Benjamin [1996] “Why Hold-ups Occur? The Self Enforcing Range of Contractual 
Relationships,” Economic Inquiry 34: 444-463. 
 
--, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian [1978], "Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, 21: 297-
326.  
 
-- & Kevin Murphy [1988] « Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, » 
Journal of Law and Economics, 31 (October): 265-297. 
 
Knoeber, Charles R. [1989] “A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the 
Production of Broilers,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 5: 271-292.  
 
Lafontaine, Francine [1993], “Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: Evidence 
from Franchising,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 9 (2): 256-289.  
 
-- & Margaret Slade [1997], “Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice,” Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 45: 1-25.  
 
--& Margaret Slade [2007] “Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence.” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45: 629-685 
 
- & Margaret Slade [2011] “Inter-Firm Contrats. Evidence.” In R. Gibbons & J. Roberts (eds.) 
Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. ZZ 
 
Langlois, Richard N. [2002] “Modularity in Technology and Organization,” Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization. 49(1): 19-37 
 
Lerner, Josh, Hilary Shane & Alexander Tsai [2003] “Do Equity Financing Cycles Matter? 
Evidence from Biotechnology Alliances,” Journal of Financial Economics, 67 (March): 411-446. 
 
Lorenzoni, Gianni & Charles Baden-Fuller [1995] “Creating a Strategic Center to Manage a 
Web of Partners.” California Management Review, 37 (3): 146-163.  
59 
 
 
Lumineau, Fabrice & Joanne E. Oxley [2008] “Working together and working things out: 
Dispute resolution in repeated vertical exchange relationships.” WP. HEC Paris. 35 pages 
 
Macaulay, Stewart [1963], "Non Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study," 
American Sociological Review, 28 (1): 55-67. 
 
MacLeod, W. Bentley [2007] “Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 45 (3): 595-628 
 
MacNeil, Ian R.  [1974] "The Many Futures of Contracts". Southern California Law Review. 
47 (May): 691-816. 
 
-- [1978] "Contracts: Adjustments of a Long Term Economic Relation under Classical, 
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law". NorthWestern University Law Review. 72: 854-
906. 
 
Madhok, A. and S. B. Tallman [1998], “Resources, Transactions and Rents: Managing Value 
Through Interfirm Collaborative Relationships,” Organization Science, 9 (3): 326-339.  
 
Malcomson, James M. [2011] “Relational Incentive Contracts”. In R. Gibbons & J. Roberts 
(eds.) Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 
XX 
 
Maness, Robert [1996] « Incomplete Contracts and the Choice between Vertical Integration 
and Franchising » Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 32: 101-115 
 
Masten, Scott E (ed.) [1996] Case Studies in Contracting and Organization, Oxford 
University Press: New York, London. 
 
Mazé, Armelle & Claude Ménard [2010] “Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-
Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry”. European Journal of 
Law and Economics, 29 (1): 131-153. 
 
Ménard, Claude [1996], “On Clusters, Hybrids and other Strange Forms. The Case of the 
French Poultry Industry,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152 (1): 154-
183. 
 
– – [1997], “Le Pilotage des formes organisationnelles hybrides,” Revue Economique, 48 (3), 
741-750. English: ‘The Governance of Hybrid Organizational Forms.’ In C. Menard (ed.) 
[2004] International Library of New Institutional Economics, Cheltenham: E. Elgar Pub., vol. 
IV: 105-113 
 
-- [2003] “Nouvelle économie institutionnelle et politique de la concurrence : le cas des 
formes organisationnelles hybrides ». Economie Rurale, 277-278 : 3-18 
 
-- [2004] « The Economics of Hybrid Organizations ». Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 160 (3): 345-376 
 
60 
 
--[2007] “The Inadequacy of Competition Policies: A New Institutional Approach”. In N. 
Mercuro (ed.), Law and Economics, London: Routledge Press, vol. 3 
 
-- [2007] “Cooperatives: Hierarchies or Hybrids?” in Jerker Nilsson and Kostas Karantininis 
(eds.), Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies. Berlin-Boston-Dordrecht-New York: 
Springer, chap.1: 7-27. 
 
-- [2009] « Oliver Williamson and the Economics of Hybrid Organizations » in Mario 
Morroni (ed.) Corporate Governance, Organization Design and the Firm. Cooperation and 
Outsourcing in the Global Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, chap. 5: 87-103 
 
--& Peter Klein [2004], “Organizational Issues in the Agri-Food Sector: Toward a 
Comparative Approach”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 86 (3): 746-751. 
 
--& Emmanuel Raynaud [2010] “Ulysses and the Sirens: Hands-Tying Governance in Hybrid 
Forms”. Working Paper, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne. 
 
--& Mary Shirley (eds.) [2005] Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Berlin: Springer-
Verlag 
 
-- & Egizio Valceschini [2005] «New Institutions for Governing the Agri-food Industry». 
European Review of Agricultural Economics, 32 (3):  421-440 
 
Milgrom, Paul, Douglass C. North & Barry Weingast [1989], "The Role of Institutions in the 
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," Economics 
and Politics, 2: 1-23. 
 
Mohr, J. & R. Spekman [1994] “Characteristics of Partnership Success: Partnership 
Attributes, communication Behavior, and Conflict Resolution Techniques” Strategic 
Management Journal, 15 (2): 135-152 
 
Nalebuff, Barry & Adam Brandenburger [1998] Co-opetition, New York: 
Currency/Doubleday 
 
Nooteboom, Bart [1999], Inter-firms Alliances. Analysis and Design, Routledge: London, 
New York. 
 
Oliver, Amalya L. & Mark Ebers [1998] “Networking Network Studies: An Analysis of 
Conceptual Configurations in the Study of Inter-organizational Relationships,” Organization 
Studies, 19 (4): 549-583.  
 
Ouchi, William G. [1980] "Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans," Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 25(1), 129-141.  
 
Oudot, Jean-Michel & Claude Menard [2010] “Opportunisme ou équité ? Le cas des contrats 
d’approvisionnement de défense ». Revue Française d’Economie, 24 (3): 196-226 
 
Oxley, Joanne [1997] “Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A 
Transaction Cost Approach,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 13 (2): 387-409.  
 
61 
 
--[1999], “Institutional Environment and the Mechanism of Governance: the Impact of 
Intellectual Property Protection on the Structure of Inter-firm Alliances,” Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 38 (3): 283-309.  
 
Paché, Gilles & Claude Paraponaris [1993] L’entreprise en réseau. Paris : Presses 
Universitaires de France. 
 
Palay, Thomas M. [1984], "Comparative Institutional Economics: the Governance of the Rail 
Freight Contract," Journal of Legal Studies, 13: 265-288. 
 
 – – [1985], "Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of 
Informal Agreements," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (1): 155-175.  
 
Park, Seung Ho [1996], “Managing an Interorganizational Network: A Framework of the 
Institutional Mechanism for Network Control”, Organization Studies, 17 (5): 795-824.  
 
Parkhe, Arvind [1993], “Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theoretic and Transaction 
Cost Examination of Interfirm Cooperation,” Academy of Management Journal, 36 (4): 794-
829. 
 
Podolny, Joel & Karen Page [1998], “Network Forms of Organizations,” Annual Review of 
Sociology, 24: 57-76.  
 
Poppo, Laura & Todd Zenger [2002] “Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance 
Function as Substitutes or Complements?”, Strategic Management Journal, 23: 707-725. 
 
Poppo, Laura , Kevin Zheng Zhou, Sungmin Ryu.[2008] “Alternative Origins to 
Interorganizational Trust: An Interdependence Perspective on the Shadow of the Past and the 
Shadow of the Future.” Organization Science, 19(1): 39-55 
 
Powell, Walter W. [1990] “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,” 
pp. 295-336, in: L.L. Cummpings and B. Staw (eds), Readings in Organizational Behavior, 
JAI Press: Greenwich, Conn.  
 
 – – [1996] “Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152 (1): 197-215.  
 
- -  [2003]  “The Capitalist Firm in  the 21 st Century. Emerging Patterns”. In P.J. DiMaggio 
(ed.), The Twenty First Century Firm: Changing Economic Organization in International 
Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
 – –, Kenneth W. Koput & Laurel Smith-Doerr [1996], “Interorganizational Collaboration and 
the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 41 (1): 116-145.  
 
Raynaud, Emmanuel [1997] Propriété et exploitation partagée d’une marque commerciale : 
aléas contractuels et ordre privé. Ph.D. Université de Paris (Panthéon-Sorbonne): Paris. 
 
62 
 
--, Loïc Sauvée, & Egizio Valceschini [2009] “Aligning branding strategies and governance 
of vertical transactions in agri-food chains,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 18 (5): 869-
899  
 
Rey, Patrick & Jean Tirole [1986] “The Logic of Vertical Restraints.” American Economic 
Review, 76 (6): 921-939.  
 
 -- & Jean Tirole [2001], “Alignment of Interest and the Governance of Joint Ventures,” IDEI 
Working Paper 441, Université de Toulouse.  
 
Richardson, George.B.  [1972] "The Organization of Industry". Economic Journal. 82: 383-
396. 
 
Robinson, David T. and Toby Stuart [2007] “Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic 
Alliances.” The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 25 (1): 242-273.  
 
Rubin, Paul H. [1978], “The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract,” 
Journal of Law & Economics, 21 (1): 223-233. 
 
--[2005] “Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges”. In C. Ménard & M. Shirley 
(eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Berlin-Dordrecht-New York: Springer. 
Chap. 9: 205-228 
 
Ryall, Michael D. and Rachelle C. Sampson [2006] “Do Prior Alliances Influence Contract 
Structure?” In A. Arino & J.J. Reuer (eds.) Strategic Alliances: Governance and Contracts. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan  
 
Sako, Mari  [2005]  “Governing Automotive Supplier Parks: Leveraging the Benefits of 
Outsourcing and Co-location?” W.P., University of Oxford-Said Business School.  
 
Sako, Mari & Susan Helper [1998] “Determinants of Trust in Supplier Relations: Evidence 
from the Automotive Industry in Japan and the United States,” Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 34 (3): 387-417 
 
Sampson, Rachelle C.  [2005] “Experience Effects and Collaborative Returns in R&D Alliances.” 
Strategic Management Journal, 26(11): 1009-31. 
 
Saussier, Stéphane [2000] “Contractrual Completeness and Transaction Costs”, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 42 (2): 189-206. 
 
Sauvée, Loic [2002] “Effectiveness, Efficiency, and the Design of Network Governance.  In 
Chain and Network Management in Agribusiness and the Food Industry, Noordwijk aan Zee 
(NL): 673-684.  
 
Simon, Herbert A. [1951] "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship". 
Econometrica. 19 (3): 293-305. 
 
Stuart, Toby E., and Joel Podolny. [1996] "Local Search and the Evolution of Technological 
Capabilities." Strategic Management Journal 17 (1): 21-38. 
 
63 
 
Teece, David E., Gary P. Pisano & Ann Shuen [1997] “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management”. Strategic Management Journal, 18 (7): 509-533. 
 
Thorelli, Henry B. [1986] "Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies," Strategic 
Management Journal. 7 (1): 37-51. 
 
Tirole, Jean [1986] “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in 
Organizations”.  Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2 (2): 181-214  
 
-- [1988] The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
 
--[1999] « Incomplete Contracts : Where Do We Stand ? » Econometrica, 67 (4): 741-782 
 
Tsoulouhas Theofanis & Tomislav Vukina [2001] “Regulating Broilers Contracts: 
Tournaments versus Fixed Performance Standards.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 83 (4): 1062-1073 
 
Uzzi, Brian  1997 « Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks : The Paradox of 
Embeddedness ». Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 35-67 
 
Visser, Bauke & Otto H. Swank [2007] “On Committees of Experts, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics.122: 337-372 
 
Wernerfelt, Birner [1984] “A Resource-Based View of the Firm”. Strategic Management 
Journal 5 (2): 171-180 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. Williamson, Oliver E. [1975]  Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and 
Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press. 
  
-- [1985], The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press-Macmillan: New York.  
 
--[1991] "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives." Administrative Science Quarterly. 36 (2): 269-296. Reprinted in [1996], chap. 4 
 
 - - [1996] The Mechanisms of Governance. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Wu, Steven & Brian Roe [2006] “Tournaments, Fairness, and Risks.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 88 (3): 561-573 
Zucker, Lynne G. [1986] "Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 
1840-1920. Research in Organizational Behavior. Vol. 8: 5 
